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ABSTRACT 
 
This study experimentally examines whether and how two potential changes to the audit 
report’s structure affect the extent to which nonprofessional investors attend to the report’s 
content when evaluating a potential investment, and whether the potential effects differ across 
levels of investor sophistication.  Specifically, I examine the impact of descriptive paragraph 
headings and the relative location of the opinion paragraph on judgments of financial statement 
reliability and investment decisions.  Results indicate that when the audit report includes 
descriptive paragraph headings, less sophisticated investors perceive the report to be more 
readable, which, in turn, leads them to attribute higher levels of reliability to the financial 
statements and increases their likelihood to invest.  I also find that perceptions of processing ease 
are more important to less sophisticated investors than the degree to which the audit report’s 
actual content is processed.  More sophisticated investors appear to be insulated from this 
heuristic bias.  In a second experiment, I examine whether the audit report’s structure affects 
investors’ ability to identify departures from the standard unqualified opinion.  Specifically, 
when the audit opinion is adverse, the relative location of the opinion paragraph moderates the 
effect of headings across levels of investor sophistication.  Overall, the results of this study 
suggest that the audit report’s structure significantly influences the extent to which 
nonprofessional investors’ attend to the report’s content, and that the audit report’s content 
informs judgments of financial statement reliability and investment decisions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study experimentally investigates whether and how the structure of the information 
communicated in the audit report influences how nonprofessional investors attend to its content.  
Specifically, I examine whether the relative placement of the audit opinion and the use of 
descriptive paragraph headings affect the extent to which investors attend to the actual content of 
the report.  I draw theory from prior psychology (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer 2009; Lemarie, 
Lorch, Eyrolle, and Virbel 2008; Schwarz et al. 1991) and accounting (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; 
Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2015) studies of text processing to develop theoretical predictions and test 
whether the audit report’s structure affects investors’ attention allocation and subsequent 
judgments.   
This study is important because the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) and the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) have proposed or adopted new auditor reporting standards in an effort 
to improve the utility of the audit report (AICPA 2013a; IAASB 2013a, IAASB 2014; PCAOB 
2013a). The ASB and IAASB have recently adopted standards that require the use of paragraph 
headings in the auditor’s report, and the IAASB’s illustrations accompanying the new standard 
implicitly suggest the Board’s preference for relocating the opinion paragraph to the beginning 
of the report (IAASB 2014).  However, despite calls for standard-setters to harmonize their 
auditor reporting models (IAASB 2011c; 2011d; PCAOB 2013c; 2013e), the PCAOB’s proposed 
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standard neither mandates the use of descriptive headings nor considers the relocation of the 
opinion paragraph.  Proponents of these two structural changes to the audit report argue that they 
will increase the report’s communicative value by enhancing its readability, which has frequently 
been cited as a limitation of the audit report’s usefulness to investors (e.g., AICPA 2013b; Asare 
and Wright 2012; AQF 2007; Church, Davis, and McCracken 2008; Mock et al. 2013; Simnett 
and Huggins 2014).   
The AICPA’s Cohen Commission raised early concern that a standardized audit report 
structure could lead users to read its actual content less carefully (AICPA 1978).  Recent 
comments to both the IAASB and PCAOB echo this concern (e.g., IAASB 2011b; 2012b; 
PCAOB 2013b).  Evidence from psychology studies of text processing also supports this 
concern, and suggests that feelings of processing ease are often subconsciously substituted for 
the actual evaluation of text-based information, which sometimes leads readers to inappropriately 
rely on information simply because they perceive it to be easier to process (Alter and 
Oppenheimer 2009).  Asare and Wright (2012) examine how different types of audit report users 
interpret the message of the current standardized form of the report, and conclude that 
standardization does not ensure uniform interpretation of the message for all stakeholders.  
Moreover, Gray et al. (2011) document evidence that nonprofessional investors are the least 
likely to read the audit report among users of financial statements.  The broader literature 
addressing financial disclosures and investor sophistication suggests that nonprofessional 
investors lack the resources, cognitive and otherwise, necessary to process the audit report’s 
information.  Moreover, standard-setters have long maintained that financial reporting and 
auditing standards should serve those users who have limited authority, ability, and resources to 
obtain information (AICPA 1973).  Therefore, it is also important to examine whether the 
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potential effects of the audit report’s structure on nonprofessional investors’ judgments depends 
on the level of investor sophistication.
1
 
While a number of concurrent studies address potential changes to the audit report (e.g., 
Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2014; Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett 2015; Brown, Majors, 
and Peecher 2014; Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014; Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and Valentine 
2014), these studies focus on potential changes to the report’s content rather than its structure.  In 
this study, I hold the information content of the audit report constant across experimental 
conditions to isolate the potential effects of its structure on how nonprofessional investors’ 
process the report’s message.  Specifically, I conduct a 2 x 2 x 2 (opinion location x headings x 
investor sophistication) between-subjects experiment to examine whether and how relocating the 
opinion paragraph and using descriptive headings in the audit report influences nonprofessional 
investors’ judgments and decisions, and whether the potential influence depends on the level of 
investor sophistication.
2
   
In a second experiment, I again manipulate headings and the location of the audit opinion 
in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design.  However, instead of the report communicating an 
unqualified opinion, as in experiment one, I explore the potential influence of audit report 
structure when the auditors issue an adverse opinion.
3
  Given that the audit opinion is generally 
accepted as the most important information communicated by the audit report (Gray et al. 2011), 
the second experiment provides an additional, and important, opportunity to observe whether the 
audit report’s structure does affect how investors’ allocate their attention when the opinion 
                                                          
1 
Additionally, nonprofessional investors comprise a significant portion of the capital markets with approximately 41 
million individuals investing directly in the stock markets (Coram 2010) and owning nearly 34% of all shares 
outstanding (Koonce and Lipe 2010), which further motivates my study of this subset of audit report users. 
2
 As described in detail in a subsequent section, the two levels of sophistication are based on participants’ 
demographic information.  Therefore, investor sophistication serves as a grouping variable, and not a manipulated 
factor. 
3
 Data for both experiments was collected simultaneously and under ceteris paribus conditions.  I treat them as 
separate experiments for expository purposes and simplification of analyses. 
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communicates negative information.  In a review of the auditor reporting literature, Church et al. 
(2008, 69) state that “the current form and wording of the audit report are such that users can 
easily distinguish a standard unqualified opinion from a nonstandard opinion.”  In my design of 
both experiments, I hold the non-opinion content of the audit report constant to isolate and test 
whether the structure (i.e., the form) of the report does in fact allow users to distinguish the 
opinion type.
 4
  
In both experiments, I recruit participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Participants assume the role of nonprofessional investors evaluating the financial reporting 
quality and investment worthiness of a hypothetical company in the technology hardware 
industry.   I provide each participant with background information about the company, a set of 
financial statements, and the auditor’s report. After examining these materials, participants form 
judgments about the reliability of the financial statements and make an investment decision.   
Overall, results indicate that the audit report’s structure significantly influences investors’ 
judgments of financial statement reliability, but the influence is stronger for less sophisticated 
investors.  Specifically, when the audit report includes descriptive headings, less sophisticated 
investors perceive the report to be more readable, which, in turn, leads them to attribute higher 
levels of reliability to the financial statements, and increases their likelihood of investment.  
Interestingly, results also suggest that perceptions of processing ease are more important to less 
sophisticated investors than the degree to which the audit report’s actual content is processed.  
Neither headings nor the location of the audit opinion meaningfully affects how more 
sophisticated investors use the audit report when the opinion is unqualified.  Regardless of 
                                                          
4
 When an adverse opinion is issued, auditing standards require inclusion of an additional paragraph in the audit 
report that explains the reasons for not issuing an unqualified opinion.  Exploiting the advantages of 
experimentation, I omit this paragraph from my design to prevent participants from inferring the opinion from the 
structure of the report, that is, counting the number of paragraphs, to ascertain the opinion type. 
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investor sophistication level, the impact of opinion location appears to depend on the type of 
opinion issued.  When the opinion is unqualified, investors find the audit report more useful 
when the opinion paragraph last rather than first.  However, this preference reverses when the 
audit opinion is adverse, such that the influence of the audit report’s structure on investment 
decisions is strongest when the opinion is presented at the report’s beginning and headings are 
present, and this effect serially operates through perceptions of the report’s readability to 
judgments of financial statement reliability.  Taken together, the results of both experiments 
indicate that the audit report’s structure does influence investors’ attention to its content, and, 
subsequently their judgments and decisions.  
The results of this study inform auditing standard-setters as they evaluate recent changes 
or consider additional changes to the structure of the audit report.  Specifically, I provide 
evidence that two seemingly innocuous formatting features, descriptive headings and opinion 
paragraph location, significantly influence how nonprofessional investors allocate attention to 
the report’s content when making judgments regarding the reliability of financial statements.  
Relative to proposed changes to the audit report’s content, such as adding critical audit matter 
paragraphs, these structural features would be far less costly to implement. I also contribute to 
the text signaling literature by considering how individual text signals trigger heuristic 
processing through an underlying psychological mechanism previously not considered in this 
line of research.  Prior research of text signaling effects calls for future studies to explore how 
simultaneous inclusion of two signaling devices potentially interact (e.g., Lemarie et al. 2008).  
My study answers these calls by focusing on two specific structural aspects of readability, the 
use of headings and placement of the opinion paragraph   My findings also extend those of two 
recent experimental accounting studies (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Tan et al. 2015).  In those 
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studies, the linguistic and structural aspects of readability were simultaneously manipulated, and 
the authors explicitly call for future work to examine how individual features influence investor 
judgments. Finally, my results enhance our understanding of how an important subset of users, 
nonprofessional investors, perceive and use the audit report.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter II explains the standard-setting 
background and develops theory and my hypotheses.  Next, Chapter III describes the 
experimental design and methodology for my two experiments.  I describe my results in Chapter 
IV, and provide concluding comments in Chapter V. 
  
7 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy describes the audit report as a key 
part of understanding the 10-K (SEC 2011a), and emphasizes its usefulness in understanding the 
financial statements (SEC 2011b).  However, many argue that investors generally ignore the 
audit report (e.g., Gray et al. 2011), contributing to standard-setters’ recent proposals to enhance 
the report’s standard content and form.  For nearly as long as the standardized model of auditor 
reporting has existed, critics have questioned whether standardization actually enhances the audit 
report’s informational value (AICPA 1978).   
Evolution of the Standardized Audit Report 
 The standardization of the audit report’s content and form began after the stock market 
crash of 1929 when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) mandated that registered firms file 
an audit report that included a standardized scope and opinion paragraph along with their annual 
reports (Carmichael 1974; Geiger 1993).
5
    The intent of the mandated wording of the opinion 
paragraph was to allow users to easily differentiate clean reports (i.e., reports issuing unqualified 
opinions) from deficient  reports (Geiger 1993).  Subsequent standards addressed the nature and 
classification of deficient audit reports.  For example, Statements on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 
No. 23 defined and prescribed the use of qualified and disclaimed opinions in 1947, and in 1961 
adverse opinions were introduced with the issuance of SAP No. 31.  The standard form of the 
auditor’s report remained largely unchanged for the next few decades until 
                                                          
5
 The standardized wording of these two paragraphs is largely consistent with the current auditor reporting model.  
Carmichael (1974, 83-84) notes that the opinion paragraph stated the following: “In our opinion… the financial 
statements fairly present, in accordance with accepted principles of accounting consistently maintained by the 
company during the year under review, its position at December 31, 1933, and its results of operations for the year.”  
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1988 when the ASB issued SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements.  Most 
notably, SAS No. 58, mandated that the audit report explicitly state that the financial statements 
are the responsibility of management, and that the auditor’s responsibility is to express an 
opinion on the financial statements based on the audit (AU §508.08).  
Prior Research of Market Reaction to Audit Report Content 
A number of prior studies focus on whether the market reacts to a report that differs from 
the wording of a standard unqualified opinion.  However, evidence from these studies is mixed.  
For example, Firth (1978) and Chow and Rice (1982) note a negative market reaction when a 
qualified audit opinion is issued.  Other studies, however, (e.g., Elliott 1982; Dodd, Dopuch, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich 1984; Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1986) find evidence that the 
market reacts before the audit report is issued, which suggests that the market responds to the 
underlying economic event(s) that lead to a qualified opinion, and not the actual disclosure of the 
opinion.   
Loudder et al. (1992) extend these findings by examining the market’s response to a 
qualified opinion when the media reports news of the underlying negative economic event before 
the auditor issues an opinion, and conclude that the market’s expectations regarding the audit 
opinion dictate its response.  In other words, if the market expects a qualified opinion, it reacts 
prior to the issuance of the audit report.  In contrast, the market negatively responds to the 
issuance of an unexpected qualified opinion.   
Strawser (1991) reviews this literature, and concludes that the market reacts to the audit 
report’s content in one of three ways: (1) no reaction when audit report content confirms 
expectations, (2) small reaction when audit report content provides incremental information 
regarding disclosures previously made by management, or (3) large reaction when the audit 
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report is the initial source of information.  However, the inherent limitations of archival data 
make it difficult to disentangle and understand these effects (Bailey, Bylinski, and Shields 1983).  
For example, despite methodological improvements since the earlier studies
6
, more recent 
studies of the market’s reaction to going-concern opinions also yield conflicting results (e.g., 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar 2004; Ogneva and Subramanyam 2007).  Furthermore, the extent to 
which researchers can understand the market’s reaction to departures from the standardized 
wording of an unqualified opinion is constrained by not only the data’s inherent noise, but also 
its availability.  The SEC’s Rule 2-02 of Regulation S-X essentially prohibits qualified or 
adverse opinions for publicly traded firms in the U.S. (Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004).  
Therefore, departures from standard unqualified opinions are exceedingly rare.  
Current Standard Setting Projects 
 The PCAOB and IAASB have recently undertaken major initiatives to improve the 
report’s utility and communicative value to users of audited financial statements (IAASB 2013a; 
PCAOB 2013a).  A number of reforms to the report’s content and form were adopted in the 
IAASB’s revised standard, and many similar reforms are also being considered by the PCAOB 
as it moves toward its own updated standard.  Specific to the structure of the audit report, 
potential reforms include changing the relative placement of the audit opinion and the use of 
standard headings.  
 While the audit opinion has traditionally been located at the end of the audit report, some 
argue that presenting it at the report’s beginning would enhance the opinion’s prominence 
(IAASB 2011a; Simnett and Huggins 2014).   A more prominently displayed opinion would 
improve investors’ ability to access what is generally considered the most relevant information 
                                                          
6
 Specifically, technological advances led to richer databases, which allowed subsequent studies to observe the 
specific publication dates of audit reports and other information sources with more precision.  
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communicated in the audit report (e.g., McEnroe and Martens 2001), which, in turn, should 
enhance the report’s usefulness in understanding the financial statements (AQF 2007; Chong and 
Pflugrath 2008; IAASB 2012b - c, e – i; PCAOB 2013e, f).  Others have expressed concern that 
presenting the opinion first might encourage users to ignore other important information (e.g., 
management’s responsibility for the financial statements, the auditor’s responsibilities, and the 
basis for the auditor’s opinion) communicated in the report, and, therefore, limit their ability to 
evaluate the opinion within its proper context (IAASB 2011e; 2011f; 2012d).   
Consistent with the ASB’s auditor reporting standard, the PCAOB’s proposal would 
allow auditors to use discretion as to the location of required reporting elements, including the 
opinion (PCAOB 2013a).  While the IAASB’s standard also allows auditor’s discretion, 
illustrations of the revised audit report provided by the Board prominently display the opinion at 
the beginning rather than the report’s end (IAASB 2014).  Some critics of a relocated opinion 
paragraph explicitly cite the lack of evidence that supports whether a mandated order of 
information presentation would improve the audit report’s communicative value to investors.  On 
the other hand, proponents state that a prominently placed audit opinion will help users readily 
determine the type of opinion issued (e.g., PCAOB 2013e). 
While commenters’ feedback regarding the potential impact of relocating the audit 
opinion has been mixed, broader support exists for mandating the use of descriptive headings for 
each of the paragraphs within the audit report (PCAOB 2013c-d, g-i).  Proponents of standard 
headings cite the current report’s lack of readability and argue that section headings would make 
the report more understandable by providing a clear map to the information most relevant to 
users.  
11 
 
The readability of the audit report is often cited as a limitation of its usefulness to 
investors (e.g., AQF 2007; IAASB 2011a; Pound 1981; Simnett and Huggins 2014; 
Vanestraelen, Scheleman, Meuwissen, and Hofmann 2012), and the emphasis on the audit 
report’s readability is consistent with the increasing focus of regulators and academics on the 
importance of disclosure readability in the broader context of financial reporting.  For example, 
in 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed The Plain English Rule 421 (d), 
which requires registered issuers to adhere to “plain English principles” in the construction of 
firm prospectuses.  In conjunction with the Plain English Rule’s passage, the SEC published the 
Plain English Handbook (SEC 1998), which outlines specific linguistic and formatting principles 
that are to guide communications of financial information.  Specifically, the SEC’s linguistic 
recommendations include the use of short sentences, active voice and positive tone.  The 
formatting recommendations include the use of a hierarchy-based structure, clear headings, and 
tabular presentation or bullet lists for complex material whenever possible. 
Recent accounting studies have used the Handbook’s principles to examine the influence 
of the SEC’s definition of readability on investor behavior.  For example, Miller (2010) develops 
a measure of 10-K readability following the handbook’s linguistic recommendations, and finds 
that more readable disclosures are associated with higher trading volume among small investors.  
Recent experimental studies (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Tan et al. 2015) also find that the 
readability of earnings guidance, as defined by the Plain English Handbook’s guidelines, impacts 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments and decisions.  These studies examine the simultaneous 
impact of the SEC’s linguistic and structural recommendations.  Therefore, it remains unclear 
whether manipulating text structure in isolation would activate similar effects.  I hold the 
12 
 
linguistic and semantical aspects of readability constant in this study to isolate the impact of the 
audit report’s structure on how the report is used.   
 Despite calls for improvements to the audit report’s readability, academic research has 
not addressed whether the report’s readability actually affects investors’ judgments and 
decisions.  Furthermore, while some argue that the use of headings and a more prominently 
located opinion would make the report more readable (e.g., PCAOB 2013e; 2013h), it remains 
unclear whether these two specific aspects of readability in isolation would affect how the report 
is used or perceived by investors (IAASB 2011f).   
Text-Based Signaling Devices and Effects 
Research in the psychology literature demonstrates that various aspects of a text’s 
structure serve as informational signals of processing instruction to readers (Meyer 1975, 1999; 
Loman and Mayer 1983; Ritchey, Schuster, and Allen 2008; Wyer, Hung, and Jiang 2008).
7
  
This literature provides several examples of text-based signals and their effects, including 
improved recall and comprehension of text content (e.g., Lorch and Lorch 1985; Grant and 
Davey 1991; Surber and Schroeder 2007), and information search strategies (e.g., Klusewitz and 
Lorch 2000; Sanchez, Lorch, and Lorch 2001).  Meyer (1975; 1984) proposed that readers rely 
on mental topic structure representations (i.e., mental maps) when synthesizing text and drawing 
inferences.  His work provided early evidence that the presence of signals, such as headings and 
selective location of information, improves readers’ ability to form mental maps of text structure 
and content, and, consequently, facilitates effective processing.  Essentially, the mental map of a 
text serves as a schematic that directs the reader’s allocation of attention (Kools, Ruiter, van de 
Wiel, and Kok 2008).  Subsequent studies demonstrated that readers’ proficiency and prior 
                                                          
7
 Studies of text signaling generally adopt Lorch’s (1989) definition of a text-based signal, which assumes that text 
content and signaling devices are independent such that a signal can be deleted without compromising text content. 
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domain knowledge can moderate the influence of text signals (e.g., Klusewitz and Lorch 2000; 
Surber and Schroeder 2007).  However, these studies generally conclude that signals promote 
more accurate mental mapping and facilitate efficient processing of text-based information 
(Loman and Mayer 1983; Ritchey, Schuster, and Allen 2008).   
While these studies provide ample evidence indicating that text-based signals facilitate 
text processing, the question of how these effects occur largely remains unanswered in this 
stream of literature.  Moreover, incorporation and systematic testing of cognitive theories of 
information processing have only recently begun in the text signaling research.
8
  One frequently 
offered explanation within these studies is that signals (e.g., headings, information location) 
serve as visual cues that evoke the spatial attribute of memory, and inform judgments with prior 
knowledge (Underwood 1969).  Specifically, readers encode pieces of information based on the 
physical space in which the information appears.  In this sense, information location serves as a 
cue, as does the space surrounding the information.  Some have proposed that spacing, say, 
between paragraphs or surrounding headings, provides optical relief for readers, and thereby, 
facilitates ease of processing (e.g., Grant and Davey 1991).   
 Overall, the text signaling literature motivates my study of whether mandating headings 
and relocating the audit opinion within the audit report affects investors’ attention to the report’s 
content as they form judgments regarding a hypothetical company’s financial statements.  
Specifically, Lemarie, Lorch, Eyrolle, and Virbel (2008) explicitly calls for future research to 
examine how various signaling techniques interact with each other, and to explore whether 
signaling implications generalize to other genres of textual information.  My study addresses 
their call, and extends the text signaling literature by jointly considering an underlying 
                                                          
8
 See Lemarie, Lorch, Eyrolle, and Virbel (2008) for a review. 
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psychological mechanism that is activated by text-based signals under certain conditions, and 
leads to heuristic, rather than systematic, information processing.   
The tasks required of experimental participants in these studies typically focus only on 
the text in which signals are manipulated, which does not reflect the myriad sources and types of 
information that investors use when making decision.  Additionally, the outcome of interest is 
generally some sort of recall or comprehension measure.  Investors base judgments of financial 
statement reliability and investment decisions on evaluation of both quantitative and qualitative 
financial information from multiple sources, which is more cognitively demanding than recall 
and comprehension tasks related to evaluation of textual information alone.  Moreover, the 
judgments on which individuals base investment decisions are inevitably made with some degree 
of uncertainty, and uncertainty leads individuals to seek simplifying heuristics to aid their 
decision-making processes (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).   
Heuristic Processing and Theories of Fluency 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) review the prior literature that addresses how 
investors’ judgments are affected by heuristic, rather than systematic, processing of financial 
information, and note that the salience of financial information is most often employed as a 
heuristic to compensate for investors’ limited attention.  Prior psychology research demonstrates 
that even minor changes in presentation format can affect the salience of information, and, 
thereby, affect the ease with which information is processed (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; 
Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993), and similar results have been found in accounting studies (e.g., 
Clor-Proell, Proell and Warfield 2014; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Maines and McDaniel 2000;).  
As the text signaling literature suggests (e.g., Lemarie et al. 2008), prominent relocation of the 
opinion paragraph and use of descriptive headers would increase the salience of the most 
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important elements of the audit report, which, in turn, should improve the cognitive ease with 
which the information is processed.   
Processing fluency is the “subjective experience of ease with which people process 
information”, and plays an important role in human judgment across a broad range of social 
dimensions (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009, 219).  Importantly, processing fluency is the 
perception of processing ease, rather than actual ease of processing.  Prior studies of processing 
fluency have demonstrated that aspects of text format, such as headings and the order in which 
information is presented, evoke feelings of processing fluency, which, in turn, induce positive 
affective reactions towards the message and/or the messenger (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, 
and Eyre 2007; Maun 2006; Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004).  The affect-fluency link
9
 is 
based on the general assumption that affective feedback is an important way in which individuals 
monitor changes in their cognitive processing and organization (Winkielman and Cacioppo 
(2001).  The two primary reasons for this assumption also introduce the potential for sub-optimal 
judgments.  First, individuals often misinterpret their perceptions of processing ease as an 
indication of good progress toward the goal of successful acquisition of the target information 
(Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner 2000).  Thus, if an individual misjudges their progress 
towards acquisition and accurate interpretation of the target information, they will be less likely 
to sufficiently process the text.  Second, perceived processing ease might be a pleasurable 
experience because it indicates, sometimes incorrectly, the availability of appropriate knowledge 
structures for the assigned task (Bless and Fielder 1995).   
Overall, these studies suggest that when evaluating text, individuals substitute their 
feelings of processing fluency for information content to compensate for a lack of available 
                                                          
9
 This link refers to the relationship between processing fluency and positive affect described above.  See 
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, and Reber (2003) for a comprehensive review. 
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cognitive resources.  This contradicts the effects predicted by the text-signaling literature, which 
suggests that signals, such as headings and information location, facilitate processing of 
information content, but is consistent with the findings of Schwarz et al. (1991), who showed 
that fluency influences judgment independently of the retrieved content that accompanies the 
experience of fluency.    
Despite the scarcity of existing accounting research that draws on processing fluency 
theory, its effects are likely pervasive across accounting settings and might be useful in 
explaining the results of some prior studies (Rennekamp 2012).  For example, Hopkins (1996) 
manipulates the accessibility of category-relevant information related to hybrid financial 
instruments through the presentation format of the balance sheet, and finds that analysts make 
more positive valuation judgments when the information is presented in a more accessible 
location.  Elliott (2006) demonstrates that investors’ unintentionally rely on more prominently 
disclosed earnings metrics in their judgments even when the more prominent metric is, 
objectively, less relevant. Similarly, Maines and McDaniel (2000) find that the presentation 
format of comprehensive income affects how individual investors determine what information is 
relevant for a judgment task, but not whether the information is actually used.   Processing 
fluency studies predict that more accessible information is perceived as more relevant not 
because of its content, but because of the ease with which it is accessed (e.g., Knoblockh, 
Zillmann, Gibson, and Karrh 2002; Schwarz et al. 1991; Shah and Oppenheimer 2007), which is 
consistent with the findings in Hopkins (1996), Elliott (2006)
 10
, and Maines and McDaniel 
(2000).   
                                                          
10
 Elliott’s findings are corroborated by archival evidence (e.g., Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto 2005; Allee, 
Bhattacharya, Black, and Christensen 2007), and the results of these studies are consistent with processing fluency 
theory.   
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Two recent experimental studies in accounting examine how the readability of 
management disclosures affects investors’ judgments.  Both experiments use the Plain English 
Handbook’s recommendations to manipulate the readability, and find that higher readability 
evokes stronger feelings of processing fluency, leads to higher assessments of management’s 
credibility, greater willingness to rely on the disclosure, and more positive performance 
judgments of the firm (Rennekamp 2012; Tan et al. 2015).   
Audit Report Structure and Judgments of Financial Statement Reliability 
The text-signaling literature shows that headings and prominent presentation of important 
information enhance actual processing ease, while the processing fluency literature demonstrates 
that they also strengthen perceptions of processing ease.  Prior studies have shown that feelings 
of processing fluency are associated with aspects of a financial disclosure’s readability.   
Specifically, enhanced readability strengthens feelings of processing fluency, which, in turn, 
leads investors to assess higher levels of the disclosure’s reliability and positive evaluations of 
the information’s source (Rennekamp 2012; Tan et al. 2015).  The positive affective reactions 
associated with feelings of processing fluency overwhelms the systematic processing of the 
target content, and is interpreted by users as actual information, which drives the subsequent 
favorable evaluations of the information and its source (Reber et al. 2004; Winkielman and 
Cacioppo 2001).   
Therefore, I predict that investors will assess higher levels of financial statement 
reliability when the accompanying audit report includes descriptive headings, and that this effect 
will operate through heightened feelings of processing fluency.  Following the same logic, I also 
expect that investors will experience higher levels of processing fluency when the audit opinion 
is located at the beginning of the audit report because the enhanced accessibility of what most 
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consider the most relevant information communicated in the report will increase the perceived 
cognitive ease associated with the judgment task.  The stronger feelings of processing fluency, in 
turn, will lead to more favorable judgments of financial statement reliability. Formally stated, I 
test the following: 
H1a:  Investors’ judgments of financial statement reliability will be positively impacted 
by the presence of descriptive headings in the audit report, and this effect will operate 
through perceptions of the report’s processing fluency such that higher levels of 
processing fluency will lead to higher assessments of financial statement reliability. 
 
H1b: Investors’ judgments of financial statement reliability will be positively impacted 
when the opinion paragraph is relocated to the beginning of the report, rather than at the 
report’s end, and this effect will operate through perceptions of the report’s processing 
fluency such that higher levels of processing fluency will lead to higher assessments of 
financial statement reliability. 
 
Investor Sophistication: Audit Report Familiarity and Processing Fluency   
Existing psychology research of how individuals process text-based information indicates 
that the effects of text structure on judgments interact with an individual’s prior knowledge and 
expertise (Lemarie et al. 2008).  For example, text-signaling studies (e.g., Klusewitz and Lorch 
2000; Surber and Schroeder 2007) find that the benefit of text signals on information processing 
is greater for individuals who have relevant prior knowledge than for those who lack such 
knowledge.  Klusewitz and Lorch (2000) observe that this is because individuals choose different 
search strategies based on their familiarity with a given text and task.  Specifically, individuals 
who lack relevant prior knowledge are more likely to employ a rote search strategy (i.e., sentence 
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by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, page by page) because they have not previously 
established a mental topic structure representation, which Meyer (1975) argues is necessary for 
information processing and comprehension.  On the other hand, individuals with relevant prior 
knowledge are likely to employ a more selective strategy based on their previously established 
mental topic structure representation.
11
  Thus, text signals that confirm a previously established 
topic representation enhance the efficiency of more knowledgeable readers’ search.    
A large literature documents how individuals use decision heuristics to compensate for 
limited cognitive resources.  This literature also provides evidence that individuals with task-
specific expertise are less likely to employ heuristic processing of information than those who 
lack such expertise (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Petty, Schumann, Richman, and 
Strathman 1993).   This provides a theoretical explanation for the findings from the text-
signaling literature that indicate interactive effects between text signals and prior knowledge 
(e.g., Klusewitz and Lorch 2000; Surber and Schroeder 2007).  In the parlance of text-signaling 
researchers, individuals lacking a previously established topic representation employ a rote 
reading strategy, which demands significant cognitive resources, and, thereby, leads individuals 
to employ heuristic processing to compensate for the high cognitive costs.   
Accounting research demonstrates that these findings generalize across a number of 
accounting settings, and suggests that less sophisticated investors are more likely to rely on 
heuristic shortcuts when evaluating financial information for potential investment (Anderson 
1988; Bouwman 1984; Coram 2010; Victoravich 2010).  Other studies provide evidence 
specifically indicating that the judgments of less sophisticated investors are more susceptible to 
various presentation formats of financial information than those of more sophisticated investors 
                                                          
11
 The selective search strategies of experienced readers observed by Klusewitz and Lorch (2000) generally include 
more frequent page advances and skipping.  Experienced readers were more likely to begin their searches at the 
middle or end of the text, rather than at the beginning. 
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(Allee, Bhattacharya, Black, and Christensen 2007; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002; Libby 
and Ernett 2014; Libby and Luft 1993), which is particularly relevant to my study.   
In this study, I examine how two specific aspects of the audit report’s structure, 
descriptive headings and the location of the opinion paragraph, influence investors’ investment 
decision-making processes.  Given that more sophisticated investors have more investing 
experience than less sophisticated investors, it follows that they also are more familiar with the 
structure and content of the audit report.  I expect that the lack of familiarity among less 
sophisticated investors will limit their capacity to unwind alternative structural presentations of 
the audit report’s content, which, in turn, will cause them to rely on their feelings of processing 
fluency to inform their judgments of financial statement reliability.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
conceptual model, which I describe formally as follows: 
H2: Investor sophistication will moderate the indirect effect of audit report structure 
through processing fluency on judgments of financial statement reliability such that the 
mediating effect of processing fluency on judgments of financial statement reliability will 
be stronger for less sophisticated investors than for more sophisticated investors. 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Model of H2 
 
 
Less Sophisticated Investors: Actual vs. Perceived Processing  
The audit opinion is generally considered to be the most important information 
communicated in the audit report (Mock, Gray, and Coram 2009; IAASB 2011a; 2012a) and 
some suggest that presenting the opinion paragraph at the beginning of the report would enhance 
the opinion’s prominence, and, therefore, improve the communicative value of the audit report.  
However, the audit report also provides information regarding management’s responsibilities for 
the financial statements, the auditor’s responsibilities for the audit, and the auditor’s basis for the 
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issued opinion.
12
  Commenters have expressed concern that audit report users already ignore the 
majority of this information and that relocating the opinion paragraph to the beginning of the 
report would encourage further neglect the remainder of the report’s content (e.g., IAASB 2011e; 
2011f; 2012d). Some argue further that the non-opinion information helps align users’ 
expectations regarding the level of assurance the audit provides with what auditing standards 
require (Asare and Wright 2012; McEnroe and Martens 2001; Vanestraelen, Scheleman, 
Meuwissen, and Hofmann 2012).  Others suggest that a more standardized structure would 
enhance users’ understanding of its entire content, which, in turn, would facilitate evaluation of 
the audit opinion in its appropriate context (e.g., Mock et al. 2009; PCAOB 2013d).    
In H2, I predict that it is probable that less sophisticated investors heuristically rely on 
processing fluency to a greater extent than more sophisticated investors when evaluating a 
potential investment.  However, it is also possible that the influence of audit report structure on 
less sophisticated investors’ understanding of the content better explains their judgments than 
their feelings of processing fluency.   Prior studies examining the respective roles of processing 
fluency and understanding in investors’ evaluations of financial disclosures yield mixed results.  
Rennekamp (2012) shows that the effect of disclosure readability on investors’ valuation 
adjustments operates through feelings of processing fluency rather than improved understanding.  
Tan et al. (2015) extend Rennekamp’s (2012) findings by manipulating the consistency of the 
message disclosed, and find that understanding, and not processing fluency, mediates investors’ 
performance judgments.  Importantly, however, both studies do not consider whether the impact 
of either mediating mechanism differs across levels of investor sophistication.  Moreover, the 
ongoing debate among standard-setters regarding the importance of non-opinion content in the 
                                                          
12
 In addition to the audit opinion, this information represents the basic elements of the audit report, and its inclusion 
is mandatory across standard-setting bodies, including the ASB, IAASB, and PCAOB. 
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audit report motivates a more direct test of whether the influence of the audit report’s structure 
does promote or inhibit the degree to which investors attend to such information, and this is 
particularly true for the least-informed subset of audit report users.  Following the logic 
underlying H2, I predict that the mediating effect of audit report structure through processing 
fluency will be stronger than the effect operating through less sophisticated investors’ 
understanding.    Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual model, which is formally stated as follows: 
H3: The effect of headings conditioned on the relative location of the audit opinion in the 
audit report on less sophisticated investors’ judgments of financial statement reliability 
will be more strongly mediated by processing fluency than by understanding of the audit 
report’s content. 
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Figure 2 
Conceptual Model of H3 
 
Processing Fluency, Reliability Judgments, and Investment Decisions 
 Thus far, I focus my theoretical predictions on how the audit report’s structure affects 
judgments of financial statement reliability.  Such judgments are important in their own right 
(Clor-Proell et al, 2014).  Regulators and standard-setters agree that the audit report should 
enhance confidence in the reliability of financial statements (Baumann 2014; Haddrill 2011).  
However, it is also important to examine whether the potential implications of the audit report’s 
structure on reliability judgments ultimately affect investment decisions.  Prior studies have 
shown that higher (lower) perceptions of reliability lead to more positive (negative) valuation 
judgments and increase (decrease) investors’ willingness to invest.  Elliott, Rennekamp, and 
White (2012) do not observe participants’ judgments of financial statement reliability, but, 
instead provide evidence that the effects of heightened feelings of processing fluency take a more 
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direct path to investment decisions.  Therefore, I predict that the path of audit report structure’s  
indirect effect on investment decisions will first flow through investors’ feelings of processing 
fluency, and then to their judgments  financial statement reliability.  I also expect that higher 
levels of confidence in the reliability of the financial statements will be associated with larger 
investments.  Formally stated, I test the following: 
H4a:  Feelings of processing fluency and judgments of financial statement reliability will 
mediate, in serial, the impact of headings in the audit report on investors’ investment 
decisions. 
H4b:   Feelings of processing fluency and judgments of financial statement reliability 
will mediate, in serial, the impact of the relative location of the audit opinion in the audit 
report on investors’ investment decisions. 
 
Audit Report Structure and Adverse Opinions 
The vast majority of audit opinions issued for SEC registrant firms are unqualified 
(Butler et al. 2004).  Per Regulation S-X, the SEC will not accept a registrant’s financial 
statements that have received anything other than an unqualified opinion.  Some argue that the 
constraint imposed by regulators on auditor’s ability to issue qualified or adverse opinions 
contributes to the lack of meaning market participants infer from the audit report (McEnroe and 
Martens 1998).  However, the regulations also limit the availability of archival data for 
researchers to examine whether investors perceive differential information content across 
opinion types, leading to calls for experimental studies of investors’ reactions to unclean audit 
opinions (e.g., Church et al. 2008). 
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It is important to examine the implications of audit report structure when the opinion is 
something other than unqualified for a number of reasons.  For example, one of the stated 
purposes of the proposed changes to the report’s structure is to improve the accessibility of the 
most relevant information communicated by the audit report – the opinion (PCAOB 2011).  The 
audit report, and, more specifically, the auditor’s opinion, provides assurance to investors that 
the financial statements are reliable (SEC 2011a).  Therefore, when investors derive little 
confidence from the opinion, they will be less likely to invest in a company’s securities (SEC 
2011b).  As stated in a comment letter submitted to the PCAOB, an audit report that more 
prominently displays the audit opinion “will help investors readily determine the type of opinion 
issued,” (PCAOB 2013e).13  Thus, it is necessary to test whether the proposed changes affect 
investors’ ability to identify departures from the standard unqualified opinion, which motivates 
my examination of the effects of audit report structure on investors’ judgments when the opinion 
is adverse in experiment two.    
 Given the rarity of adverse opinions, it is unlikely that investors expect anything other 
than an unqualified opinion.  Therefore, when the opinion is located at the end of the report and 
headings are absent, I expect that investors will not easily identify a departure from the standard 
wording of an unqualified opinion.  Moreover, the rarity of adverse opinions also makes it less 
likely that investors will sufficiently understand the implications of an adverse opinion, even 
when a departure from the standard wording is identified.   
As described in theoretical development of experiment one, feelings of processing 
fluency are generally interpreted positively.  However, prior studies have shown that when 
fluently disclosed information is negatively valenced, such as disclosure of an adverse audit 
                                                          
13
 Other commenters to both the PCAOB and IAASB who are not cited in this paper expressed similar sentiment 
regarding the importance of the audit report structure for identifying the type of opinion issued. 
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opinion, amplify negative reactions to the disclosure and its source in the same way that 
positively valenced information amplifies positive reactions (Brinol, Petty, and Tormala 2006).  
Additionally, the heading required by auditing standards for adverse opinions is “Adverse 
Opinion”, which I adopt for the headings condition in experiment two.  In contrast, the heading 
related to unqualified opinions is simply “Opinion”.  This suggests that when the opinion is 
adverse, the heading likely sends a richer signal, which increases the salience of the negatively 
valenced information communicated by the opinion paragraph.  Therefore, I expect that the 
effect of headings that clearly identify the type of opinion and its location will lead to stronger 
feelings of processing fluency, and, consequently, result in more negative assessments of 
financial statement reliability.  I also expect that the effect of headings will interact with the 
relative location of the opinion paragraph such that when headings are present, participants will 
experience stronger feelings of processing fluency when the opinion is located at the report’s 
beginning rather than end.  Thus, negative reactions to the adverse opinion will be strongest 
when headings are present and the opinion is relocated to the beginning of the report.  The 
conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 3, and formally stated as follows: 
 
H5:  When the audit opinion is adverse, the presence of headings in the audit report will 
negatively affect investors’ judgments of financial statement reliability, and this effect 
will be moderated by the relative location of the audit opinion such that investors will 
judge the financial statements to be less reliable when the audit opinion is presented at 
the beginning of the report compared to when the opinion is presented at the report’s end. 
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Figure 3 
Conceptual Model of H5 
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  III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
I test my hypotheses with two experiments using a 2 (headings) x 2 (opinion location) 
between-subjects design.  The factorial design for experiment one also includes two levels of 
investor sophistication based on participants’ demographic information, which I describe in 
detail below.   The design and procedure of my second experiment is similar to that of the first 
experiment, but with a few exceptions.  First, my formal predictions focus on a single mediator, 
processing fluency.  The second, and most important, difference relates to the type of opinion 
issued in the audit report.  In experiment two, all manipulated audit reports issue an adverse 
opinion, rather than the unqualified opinion issued in experiment one.  This particular difference 
has implications for my manipulation of headings, which I describe further in a subsequent 
section.   
For both experiments, I recruit participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online labor market in which “workers” (participants) are paid to 
complete “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs).  Since its launch in 2005, MTurk has become an 
increasingly popular source of experimental participants for social science researchers (Brandon, 
Long, Lorass, Mueller-Phillips, and Vansant 2014; Burhmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; 
Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014; Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby 2014; Goodman, Cryder, and 
Cheema 2013; Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010).   
In a recent exploratory study, Krische (2014) examines the validity of MTurk workers as 
surrogates for individual or nonprofessional investors by assessing whether the results of four 
experiments across three extant accounting research experiments (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and 
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Pronk 2007; Kadous, Koonce, and Towry 2005; Nelson and Rupar 2015)
14
 replicate with a 
sample of MTurk participants.  Krische’s (2014) results were consistent with those of the 
original experiments, but, importantly, only among MTurk participants who report previous 
investment experience.  Following the approach of Krische (2014), Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 
(2015) use a sample of MTurk workers to replicate an earlier accounting research experiment 
from Koonce et al. (2008) who had used M.B.A. students as proxies for nonprofessional 
investors.  The 2014 study required the MTurk workers to have completed at least two 
accounting and/or finance classes and have experience in reading financial statements.  Based on 
those two screens, Koonce et al. (2015) validated the findings of Koonce et al. (2008) with the 
MTurk sample, suggesting that the MTurk participant pool is appropriate for studies examining 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments and decisions.15  Following Koonce et al. (2015), I require 
that participants have completed at least two accounting and/or finance courses and that they 
have experience evaluating financial statements.  I also collect extensive demographic data in 
order to ensure that participant demographics are reasonable and consistent with prior studies.   
Procedure 
In both experiments, I provide participants with background information for a company 
operating in the technology hardware industry that they are to evaluate as a potential investment.  
After receiving information about the company’s background, participants receive the 
company’s comparative balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows.  In 
addition to the financial statements, participants also receive one of eight randomly assigned 
manipulated versions of the independent auditor’s report. I then ask participants a series of 
                                                          
14
 All studies replicated by Krische (2014) used nonprofessional investors (Elliott et al. 2007) or M.B.A. students as 
surrogates for nonprofessional investors (Elliott et al. 2007; Kadous et al. 2005; Nelson and Rupar 2015). 
15
 Other recent accounting studies that use MTurk for nonprofessional investors include Rennekamp (2012) and 
Rennekamp et al. (2014).   
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questions regarding their perceptions of the company’s financial reporting quality, the audit 
report, and their investment decision-making process.  Finally, participants respond to a number 
of demographic questions, and are compensated $1.50 for their participation.  On average, 
participants complete the materials in approximately 20 minutes.  See Appendix A for an 
illustration of all experimental materials and questions.   
Experimental Manipulations  
Experiment One 
 I manipulate headings by including (excluding) the following descriptive headings in the 
audit report:   “Introduction”, “Responsibilities of Management for the Financial Statements”, 
“Auditor’s Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements”, “Basis of Opinion”, and 
“Opinion”.16  I manipulate the relative location of the opinion paragraph within the body of the 
audit report by either placing the opinion at the beginning of the report, or at the report’s end 
immediately following the basis of opinion subsection.  The former experimental manipulation is 
consistent with illustrative examples from the IAASB’s auditor reporting standard (IAASB 
2013), while the latter is consistent with the illustrative examples from the PCAOB’s proposed 
standard (PCAOB 2013). 
Investor Sophistication Level  
 Following the technique employed by Tan, Wang and Zhou (2014), I use several 
demographic characteristics to measure investor sophistication level.  Specifically, I conduct a 
principal components analysis with a varimax rotation on participants’ level of education, total 
                                                          
16
 The ASB’s recently revised auditor reporting standard AU-C §700, Forming an Opinion and Reporting on 
Financial Statements requires the following headings for each respective element of the report: “Management’s 
Responsibility for the Financial Statements”; “Auditor’s Responsibility”; and “Opinion” (AU-C §700, AICPA 
2013a).  The IAASB’s standard would mandate inclusion of the following additional elements and headings within 
the report: “Basis of Opinion”; “Key Audit Matters”; “Going Concern” and “Other Information” (ISA 700).  
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accounting courses completed, total finance courses completed, years of work experience, 
experience investing in stocks, experience investing in mutual funds mutual funds, and 
experience using financial statements and audit reports in investment decisions.  The analysis 
extracts three factors. Frequency of reading financial statements and audit reports load heavily 
onto component 1 with factor loadings of 0.88 and 0.87 for component 1, 0.02 and 0.06 for 
component 2, and 0.14 and 0.05 for component 3, respectively. Investing experience in stocks 
and mutual funds load heavily onto component 2 with factor loadings are 0.80 and 0.83 for 
component 2, 0.14 and 0.13 for component 1, and 0.04 and 0.09 for component 3, respectively.  
Accounting and finance courses load heavily onto component 3 with factor loadings are 0.75 and 
0.75 for component 3, 0.08 and 0.08 for component 1, and 0.01 and 0.09 for component 2, 
respectively.  Consistent with the findings documented in Elliott et al. (2007) and Tan, Wang, 
and Zhou (2014), the factor loadings for years of work experience are low, and fall below the 
benchmark of 0.70 for inclusion recommended by Carmines and Zeller (1979).  Therefore, I 
exclude work experience from my calculation of investor sophistication scores. 
 Next, I calculate a sophistication score for each participant by summing the standardized 
values of the demographic variables included in the principal components analysis.
17
 
Sophistication scores range from -9.93 to 8.82, have a mean value of 0.00, and median of 0.07.  I 
then split participants into more and less sophisticated investor groups based on the median 
sophistication score.  Among the more sophisticated investors, 35% had completed at least some 
postgraduate study, and 46% had taken at least three accounting courses.  Specifically, 18.9% 
reported that they had completed three accounting courses, 22% between four and ten courses, 
and 5% more than ten courses.  In contrast, among less sophisticated investors, only 11% had 
                                                          
17
 The use of standardized values is necessary due to the differential scales among the demographic questions used 
to calculation investors’ sophistication level. 
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completed at least some postgraduate study, and 16% had taken at least three accounting courses.  
Additionally, 72% of the more sophisticated investors reported that when they are evaluating a 
company’s stock as a potential investment, they read the company’s financial statements, and 
24% stated that they also refer to the audit report.  For less sophisticated investors, only 24% 
consistently read the financial statements, and 7% refer to the audit report. 
Experiment Two 
 My respective manipulations of headings and the relative location of the opinion 
paragraph in the audit report are consistent with those described in experiment one with two 
exceptions.  Given that the opinion is adverse, rather than unqualified, I modify the first line of 
the opinion paragraph as follows: “the accompanying financial statements do not present fairly”.  
Additionally, the opinion paragraph’s heading reads “Adverse Opinion”, rather than simply 
“Opinion”.  Both the modification to the opinion paragraph’s first line and heading are consistent 
with ASB auditing standards (AU-C §705, Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent 
Auditor’s Report).  However, the standards also require that basis of the adverse opinion be 
described in a separate paragraph in the report, which I omit from the experimental audit reports 
to prevent participants from inferring the type of opinion strictly from the number of paragraphs 
the report contains.  The primary purpose of my second experiment is to determine whether 
manipulating the audit report’s structure affects users’ ability to identify a departure from the 
standard unqualified opinion.  Therefore, I do not alter any other aspect of the content or form of 
the report in experiment two other than what I previously describe.  This design choice makes for 
a subtle manipulation, particularly in the absence of headings.  Thus, evidence that suggests that 
relocating the opinion paragraph affects users’ ability to identify the type of opinion would be 
particularly compelling.
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Participants 
Experiment One 
In total, 550 participants are recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online 
platform for experiment one, of which 282 are immediately screened based on the requisite 
number of accounting and finance courses and experience evaluating financial statements 
previously described.  268 participants complete the experimental materials, of which 191 are 
male and 77 are female.  45% of participants are between 26 and 34 years old, and 30% are 
between 35 and 54 years old. Participants reported an average of 12 years full time work 
experience, 49% have completed a bachelor’s degree, and 23% have completed at least some 
postgraduate work.    
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009) recommend use of rigorous attention check 
questions to further ensure the validity of responses when using MTurk.  I adapt the attention 
check question used by Oppenheimer et al. (2009) in my study
18
, and exclude 26 participants 
who failed to answer the question correctly from all reported analyses, leaving a final sample of 
242.
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Experiment Two 
Of the 521 participants recruited for experiment two, 267 do not meet the requirements 
for number of accounting and/or finance courses completed and prior experience using financial 
statements, leaving 254 eligible to complete the study. Demographic characteristics are similar to 
participants in experiment 1.  156 are male and 98 are female, 47% of participants are between 
                                                          
18 Specifically, participants read and respond to the following: “What do you think this study was about?  Research 
in decision-making shows that people, when making decisions and answering questions, prefer not to pay attention 
and minimize their effort as much as possible.  Some studies show that over 50% of people don’t carefully read 
questions.  If you are reading this question and have read all the other questions, please select the box labeled 
‘other’.  Thank you for participating and taking the time to read through the questions.” Potential responses are as 
follows: “Good decision-making”, “Financial decision making”, Understanding financial statements”, 
“Understanding audit reports”, and “Other”.  Only participants who selected “Other” were included in my analyses. 
19
 Inclusion of these 26 participants does not substantively alter my results. 
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26 and 34 years old, and 34% are between 35 and 54 years old.  Average full time work 
experience is 12 years, 52% have completed a bachelor’s degree, and 21% have completed at 
least some postgraduate work.  13 participants incorrectly responded to the attention check 
question.  As in experiment one, I exclude these from all analyses, leaving a final sample of 241 
participants for experiment two.
20
 
Dependent Variables 
Financial Statement Reliability Judgment  
I adapt my measure of participants’ judgments of financial statement reliability from 
those used by prior experimental studies (e.g., Lowe and Pany 1995) by asking: “How much 
confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the Company’s 
financial statements in general?” (0 = Not at all confident and 10 = Very confident). 
Investment Decision  
To measure the amount participants are willing to invest in the hypothetical company 
after reviewing the financial statements and audit report, I ask the following: “Assume that you 
have $50,000 in a checking account to invest in Connected, Inc., or to save.  Having reviewed 
Connected, Inc.’s financial statements, and the audit firm’s report on those financial statements, 
indicate below how much of the $50,000 will be either invested in Connected, Inc. or saved.  The 
amounts designated for each option must sum to $50,000.” To stabilize the variance in this 
measure, I perform a natural log transformation of participants’ investment decisions, and use the 
transformed values in all analyses.   
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 As in experiment one, inclusion of these 13 participants does not substantively alter the results of experiment two. 
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Mediator Variables 
Processing Fluency  
I adapt my measure of processing fluency from those commonly employed in in the 
processing fluency literature (e.g., Oppenheimer 2006) by asking participants “How difficult was 
it to read the auditor’s report?” (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult).  Thus, lower 
values reflect higher levels of processing fluency. 
Understanding Scores   
Psychology studies of text processing often assess ‘understanding’ with multiple choice 
questions that test the correctness of participants’ interpretation of the message read (e.g., Melby-
Lervag and Lervag 2013; Miele and Molden 2010), and have also been employed in accounting 
studies of the effects of processing fluency (e.g., Tan et al. 2015).  Rupp, Ferne, and Choi (2006) 
recommend inclusion of at least one question per major content area, and one that assesses the 
interrelationships among all content areas.  Thus, I form a composite understanding score based 
on responses to four separate questions.  The first three relate to three of the four required 
reporting elements: the audit opinion, management’s responsibility, and the basis of the opinion, 
respectively.  The fourth question relates to the presentation order of each major section in the 
audit report.  My rationale for this question is grounded on the assumption that a mental 
representation of the text’s structure is necessary for thorough comprehension of content (Meyer 
1975).  Correct identification of the audit report’s structure would provide some indication that 
such a mental representation has been constructed.   
The four questions and related answer choices are as follows:  (Question 1) “Which of 
the following best describes Connected Inc.’s financial statements?”  Participants may choose 
from the following three options: (1) “The financial statements present fairly, in all material 
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respects, the financial position of the Company, the results of operations and its cash flows,” (2) 
“The financial statements do not present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of 
the Company, the results of operations and its cash flows,” or (3) “Neither”.  (Question 2) 
“Which of the following best describes management’s responsibility for the preparation and fair 
presentation of the financial statements?”  (1) Management is solely responsible for the 
preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements,” (2) Management shares 
responsibility with the auditors for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial 
statements,” or (3) “Neither”. (Question 3) “Which of the following best describes the basis of 
the auditor’s opinion?”  (1) The audit standards require that the auditors plan and perform the 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether due to error or fraud,” (2) The audit standards require that the auditors 
plan and perform the audit to obtain absolute assurance about whether the financial statements 
are free of material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud,” or (3) “Neither.”  (Question 4)  
“Which of the following choices best describes the presentation order of the information in the 
audit report?” (1) “Opinion, Management’s Responsibility, Auditor’s Responsibility, Basis of 
Opinion,” (2) Management’s Responsibility, Auditor’s Responsibility, Basis of Opinion, 
Opinion,” (3) Opinion, Auditor’s Responsibility, Management’s Responsibility, Basis of 
Opinion,” or (4) Auditor’s Responsibility, Management’s Responsibility, Basis of Opinion, 
Opinion.” 
 For each of the four questions, I randomize the order in which answer choices appear. I 
also randomize the presentation order of the actual questions themselves.   Randomization of 
question order and answer choices mitigates the risk of invalid responses (Rupp et al. 2006).  
Participants were restricted from reviewing the financial statements and audit report while 
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responding to questions.  For the first three questions, participants receive one point for each 
correct answer and zero points for incorrect answers.  For the fourth question, participants 
receive one point for correctly identifying the actual presentation order.  However, participants 
receive zero points if they select an incorrect answer, but at least identify the correct location of 
the audit opinion.  They receive a negative one for the fourth question if they select an incorrect 
answer that specifically misplaces the opinion’s location.  Participants’ therefore can receive a 
composite understanding score as high as four, and as low as negative one.
21
  
  
                                                          
21
 Alternative weighting of the four questions on which my composite understanding score is based (e.g., 
standardized weighting across all questions) does not affect results. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
Experiment One 
 As a check on my manipulation of headings, I ask participants to respond to the following 
true or false question: “The audit report used descriptive headings to identify separate topics 
throughout the report.”  83.3% of participants answered correctly.  To assess my manipulation of 
opinion location, I ask participants to identify the correct presentation order of the audit report’s 
information among four choices.  68% of participants correctly identified the location of the 
opinion paragraph.  Results of my primary analyses are qualitatively similar when I exclude 
participants who failed the manipulation check questions.   
Experiment Two 
While results of the opinion location check were similar to those in experiment one, with 
68% correctly identify the opinion’s location in the audit report, only 60% correctly answered 
the true/false question regarding the presence of headings.  However, results of my primary 
analyses persist even when I exclude participants who failed the manipulation check. Prior 
studies of text characteristics and processing fluency describe potential problems with 
assessments of successful manipulation (e.g., Miele and Molden 2010).  Specifically, processing 
fluency affects judgment preattentively (Winkielman et al. 2012).  Therefore, the fact that a 
larger proportion of my sample in experiment two failed one of my manipulation check questions 
than in experiment one might not necessarily indicate unsuccessful manipulation. 
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Tests of H1 
In H1, I predict that participants will perceive the financial statements to be more reliable 
when the audit report includes descriptive headings (H1a) and when the audit opinion is placed 
at the beginning of the report, rather than at the report’s end (H1b).  H1 also predicts that 
processing fluency will mediate the effects of audit report structure.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
directional impact of my manipulations on judgments of financial statement reliability.  Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the ANOVA model (Panel B) of participants’ 
financial statement reliability judgements.  As predicted, participants perceive the financial 
statements to be more reliable when headings are present (mean = 8.87 vs. 8.47), and this effect 
is statistically significant (F1,238 = 4.14; p = 0.02).  However, I do not find support for predicted 
main effect of opinion location (F1,238 = 2.02; p = 0.08).  In fact, mean values reported in Panel 
A of Table 1 suggest that relocating the opinion paragraph to the beginning of the audit report 
might actually decrease, rather than increase, perceived levels of financial statement reliability 
(mean = 8.53 vs. 8.80). 
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Figure 4 
 
Mean Plots: Financial Statement Reliability 
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Table 1 
ANOVA: Financial Statement Reliability Judgments (H1)
a
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean, (SD), [n]
b
       
 
    Headings   No Headings     
 
 
Opinion at 
Beginning 
  
8.87       
(1.59)          
[60] 
  
8.18      
(1.98)         
[60] 
  
8.53   
(1.82)    
[120] 
 
 
Opinion at 
End 
  
8.86       
(1.12)          
[59] 
  
8.75      
(1.31)         
[63] 
  
8.80   
(1.22)    
[122] 
 
 
  
8.87      
(1.37)       
[119] 
 
8.47      
(1.69)       
[123] 
  
 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
c
 
Source Type III S.S. df M.S. F-stat  p-value 
Headings 9.72 1 9.72 4.14 0.02 
Location 4.75 1 4.75 2.02 0.08 
Headings x Location 4.83 1 4.83 2.06 0.08 
Error 558.77 238 2.35 
  
      NOTES: 
a. Financial Statement Reliability: "How much confidence do you have in the reliability and 
accuracy of the values reported in the Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all 
confident, and 10=Very confident).  
b. Panel A presents means, standard deviations (SD), and number of participants per 
experimental condition [n] 
c. Panel B presents results of the two-way ANOVA model for the two experimentally 
manipulated variables.  Headings is manipulated at two levels: headings are present (Headings 
= 1) or are absent (Headings = 0) in the audit report.  Location is manipulated at two levels: 
the audit opinion is presented at the beginning (Location = 1) or at the end (Location = 0) of 
the audit report.   
43 
 
Table 2 presents results of two separately estimated simple mediation models using 
ordinary least squares path analysis to test for the respective indirect effects of headings (H1a) 
and opinion location (H1b) through processing fluency, and I illustrate the estimated models in 
Figure 5.    Processing fluency is measured by asking participants’ how difficult it was to read 
the audit report (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult).  Therefore, lower values reflect 
higher levels of processing fluency.  Panel B of Table 2 indicates that processing fluency reliably 
predicts judgments of financial statement reliability (p < 0.01), and the negative coefficient (-
0.15) confirms that the statistically significant relationship is positive, as predicted.  Bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes 2013) were 
entirely below zero for the indirect effect of headings (LLCI = -0.199, ULCI = -0.017), which 
indicates that the effect of headings on financial statement reliability judgments is significantly 
mediated by processing fluency.  As with the predicted main effect of opinion location, I do not 
find statistical support for the mediation of the relationship between opinion location and 
financial statement reliability judgments.  Thus, test results support H1a, but not H1b.  
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Figure 5 
 
Indirect Effects of Headings and Opinion Location  
 
 
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Headings 
 
 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect of Opinion Location 
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p < 0.01
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Table 2 
 
Financial Statement Reliability Judgments  
and Processing Fluency (H1)
a
 
                
Panel A: Regression Model of Processing Fluency
b
 
 
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
Headings  0.61 
 
0.33 
 
1.83 
 
0.03 
Location -0.09 
 
0.12 
 
0.27 
 
0.40 
         Panel B: Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
c
 
 
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
Fluency -0.15 
 
0.04 
 
-3.73 
 
<0.01 
Headings  0.50 
 
0.20 
 
 2.52 
 
  0.01 
Location -0.31 
 
0.20 
 
-1.57 
 
  0.06 
        Panel C: Indirect Effect(s) through Processing Fluency
d
 
 
Effect 
 
Boot SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
Headings -0.09 
 
0.05 
 
-0.199 
 
-0.017 
Location  0.01 
 
0.05 
 
-0.093 
 
  0.061 
        NOTES: 
  a. Table 2 presents results of two separately estimated mediation models based on OLS regression path analysis for 
the effects of headings and opinion location, respectively, in the audit report on judgments of financial statement 
reliability.  All reported p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b. Panel A presents the results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  Processing fluency was 
measured by asking participants "How difficult was it to read the audit report” (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very 
difficult).  Thus, lower values reflect higher levels of processing fluency. 
c. Panel B presents the results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability judgments.  Financial 
statement reliability was measured by asking participants "How much confidence do you have in the reliability and 
accuracy of the values reported in the Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very 
confident).    
d. Panel C presents reports 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples for 
the indirect effects of headings and opinion location, respectively, on judgments of financial statement reliability.  
Bootstrap samples for each indirect effect were seeded by a common number to ensure that each respective 
confidence interval was based on the same 10,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes 2013).   
  
Given the results of H1b, I also test whether the indirect effect of headings through 
processing fluency on judgments of financial statement reliability is moderated by the relative 
location of the opinion paragraph.  Untabulated results indicate that the relationship between 
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headings and judgments of financials statement reliability is significantly mediated when the 
audit opinion is presented at the end of the audit report (LLCI = -0.261, ULCI = -0.009), but not 
when the audit opinion is presented at the beginning (LLCI = -0.124, ULCI = 0.105).  A formal 
test of whether the indirect effects of headings across the two levels of opinion location are equal 
does not allow me to conclude that the difference is statistically reliable (LLCI = -0.043, ULCI = 
0.306). However, these results might suggest a preference, or possibly an expectation, for the 
traditional location of the opinion paragraph, and I discuss this possibility further in subsequent 
sections. 
Tests of H2 
 In H2, I predict that the effects of headings and the relative location of the audit opinion 
in the audit report on judgments of financial statement reliability vary across levels of investor 
sophistication.  Specifically, I predict that the indirect effect through processing fluency will be 
stronger for less sophisticated investors than for more sophisticated investors.  Panel B of Table 
3 reveals a significant three-way interaction between headings, opinion location, and investor 
sophistication (F1,234 = 4.42; p = 0.02), and a marginally significant interaction of headings and 
opinion location (F1,234 = 3.42; p = 0.06).  I probe the three-way interaction by estimating the 
simple two-way interactions for both more and less sophisticated investors, respectively (See 
Figure 6).  As reported in Panel C, the simple main effect of the interaction between headings 
and opinion location for less sophisticated investors is also statistically significant (F1,234 = 3.96; 
p = 0.05), but not for more sophisticated investors (F1,234 = 0.01; p = 0.93).     
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Figure 6 
Financial Statement Reliability Means across Levels of Investor Sophistication 
 
Panel A: Less Sophisticated Investors 
 
 
Panel B: More Sophisticated Investors 
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 Table 3 
 
Three-Way ANOVA:  
Audit Report Structure and Investor Sophistication (H2)
a
 
    
 
 
      Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean, (SD), [n] 
b
 
  
Less Sophisticated  
 
More Sophisticated 
    Headings   
No 
Headings     Headings   
No 
Headings   
Opinion at 
Beginning 
  
9.00       
(1.35)          
[34] 
8.00        
(1.19)          
[33] 
8.51     
(1.75)      
[67] 
  
8.69       
(1.87)          
[26] 
8.41       
(1.99)          
[27] 
8.55     
(1.92)      
[53] 
Opinion at 
End 
  
8.59       
(1.19)          
[27] 
8.72      
(1.17)          
[25] 
8.65     
(1.17)      
[52] 
  
9.09      
(1.03)          
[32] 
8.72        
(1.17)          
[25] 
8.91     
(1.25)      
[70] 
  
8.82     
(1.28)      
[61] 
 
8.31     
(1.71)      
[58] 
  
8.91     
(1.47)      
[58] 
 
8.62     
(1.47)      
[58] 
 
 
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
c
 
Source Type III S.S. df M.S. F-stat p-value 
Headings 2.76 1 2.76 1.18 0.15 
Location 5.67 1 5.67 2.42 0.07 
Sophistication 0.74 1 0.74 0.31 0.30 
Headings x Location 8.03 1 8.03 3.42 0.06 
Headings x Sophistication 0.05 1 0.05 0.02 0.44 
Location x Sophistication 0.33 1 0.33 0.14 0.36 
Headings x Location x Sophistication 10.38 1 10.38 4.42 0.02 
Error 549.12 234 2.35 
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Table 3 cont. 
Panel C: Simple Two-Way Interactions of Headings and Location
d
 
Sophistication Type III S.S. df M.S. F-stat p-value 
Less 9.30 1, 234 9.30 3.96 0.05 
More 0.02 1, 234 0.02 0.01 0.93 
  
NOTES: 
a. The measure of investor sophistication is based on standardized scores of participants' demographic data.  I 
classify participants as either more or less sophisticated based on the median value of calculated sophistication 
scores. Financial statement reliability: "How much confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of 
the values reported in the Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very confident).  
b. Panel A presents means, standard deviations (SD), and number of participants per experimental condition 
[n]. 
c. Panel B presents results of the three-way ANOVA for the three independent variables, headings, location, 
and sophistication.  Headings is manipulated at two levels: headings are present (Headings = 1) or are absent 
(Headings = 0) in the audit report.  Location is manipulated at two levels: the audit opinion is presented at the 
beginning (Location = 1) or at the end (Location = 0) of the audit report.  Sophistication is manipulated at two 
levels: More Sophisticated (Sophistication = 1) and Less Sophisticated (Sophisticated = 0).  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
d. Panel C presents results of the simple two-way interactions of headings and opinion location at each level of 
investor sophistication.  F-statistics were calculated based on the degrees of freedom and residual mean square 
value from the three-way ANOVA model reported in Panel B. 
   
Figure 7 presents the statistical diagram of the moderated mediation analysis performed 
to test H2, and Table 4 reports results.  Path c2’ indicates that when controlling for headings and 
investor sophistication, relocating the opinion paragraph to the beginning of the report 
significantly affects judgments of financial statement reliability (t = -2.20; p = 0.02), and the 
negative coefficient (-0.61) is consistent with the directional change in mean values reported in 
Panel A of Table 1 in the test of H1b.  Moreover, the results reported in Panel C indicate that a 
direct effect of headings exists only when the opinion is located at the beginning of the audit 
report (t = 2.85; p = 0.01) and not at the report’s end (t = 0.69; p = 0.49).   
While the conditional direct effects are of some interest, they are not the primary focus of 
H2, which is whether headings and the location of the audit opinion in the audit report indirectly 
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influence judgments of financial statement reliability, and whether the indirect effect(s) vary 
across investor sophistication levels.  Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the OLS 
regression model of processing fluency.  Note that, as predicted, the interaction of headings and 
sophistication (depicted as path a4 in Figure 7) is statistically significant (t = -2.51; p < 0.01), 
which suggests that less sophisticated investors experience a different level of processing fluency 
when the audit report includes headings than is experienced by more sophisticated investors.  
 Panel D of Table 4 reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based 
on 10,000 bootstrap samples for the indirect effect (s) of including headings in the audit report 
conditioned on investors’ level of sophistication, and the relative location of the audit opinion in 
the audit report.  The lower- and upper-limits of the confidence intervals for less sophisticated 
investors across both levels of opinion location are entirely below zero (opinion at beginning 
LLCI = -0.330, ULCI = -0.019; opinion at end LLCI = -0.449, ULCI = -0.043), indicating a 
statistically significant indirect effect of headings through processing fluency, regardless of 
opinion location.  However, there is no evidence of mediation for more sophisticated investors at 
either level of opinion location.  In two separately conducted tests (untabulated), I directly 
examine whether the indirect effects of headings, and opinion location, respectively, for more 
sophisticated investors differs from that experienced by less sophisticated investors.  The results 
of these two sets of analyses indicate that a statistically significant difference exists between 
more and less sophisticated investors for the indirect effect of headings through processing 
fluency (95% bootstrap confidence intervals LLCI = 0.061, ULCI = 0.447), but not for the 
indirect of opinion location (LLCI = -0.144, ULCI = 0.215).   
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Figure 7 
Statistical Diagram of H2 Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Processing 
Fluency
Headings
Reliability 
Judgment
Investor 
Sophistication
Fluency x 
Sophistication
Opinion 
Location
Headings x 
Sophistication
Headings x 
Location
c1 = 0.19  
p = 0.25
c2 = -0.61 
p = 0.02
c3' = 0.61 
p = 0.06
b1 = -0.12 
p = 0.02
b2 = 0.31 
p = 0.23
b3 = -0.04 
p = 0.63
a1 = 1.74    
p < 0.01
a2 = -0.17 
p = 0.71
a3 = 0.35 
p = 0.23
a4 = -1.63
p < 0.01
a5 = -0.71 
p = 0.14
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Table 4 
Moderating Role of Investor Sophistication (H2)
a
 
                        
Panel A: Regression Model of Processing Fluency
b
 
   
* 
 
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
Headings     a1    1.74   0.58    2.99   <0.01 
Location     a3    0.35   0.46    0.75     0.23 
Sophistication     a2   -0.17   0.46   -0.37     0.71 
Headings x Location   a5   -0.71   0.65   -1.10     0.14 
Headings x Sophistication a4   -1.63   0.65   -2.51   <0.01 
            
Panel B: Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
c
 
      *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Fluency     b1   -0.12   0.06   -1.99   0.02 
Headings     c1'    0.19   0.28    0.69   0.25 
Location     c2'   -0.61   0.28   -2.20   0.02 
Sophistication     b2    0.31   0.41    0.75   0.23 
Headings x Location   c3'    0.61   0.39    1.56   0.06 
Fluency x Sophistication b3   -0.04   0.08   -0.48   0.63 
            
Panel C: Conditional Direct Effect(s)
d
  
    Location   Effect   SE   t-stat   p-value 
    Beginning   0.81   0.28   2.85   0.01 
    End   0.19   0.28   0.69   0.49 
            
Panel D: Conditional Indirect Effect(s)
e
  
Sophistication   Location   Effect   SE   LLCI   ULCI 
Less   Beginning   -0.12   0.09   -0.330   -0.019 
Less   End   -0.20   0.12   -0.449   -0.043 
More 
 
Beginning 
 
 0.09 
 
0.10 
 
-0.032 
 
  0.310 
More 
 
End 
 
-0.02 
 
0.09 
 
-0.174 
 
  0.124 
            
NOTES: 
a. Table 4 presents results of analyses of moderated mediation based on OLS regression path analysis for effects of  
headings conditioned on audit opinion location through processing fluency, conditioned on investor sophistication, 
on judgments of financial statement reliability.  All p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b. Panel A presents results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  DV: "How difficult was it to read 
the audit report" (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult).  
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Table 4 cont. 
c. Panel B presents results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability judgments.  DV: "How 
much confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the Company's financial 
statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very confident).    
d. Panel C reports the direct effect(s) of including headings in the audit report on judgments of financial statement 
reliability, conditioned on the relative location of the audit opinion. 
e.  Panel D reports 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples for indirect 
effect(s) of headings conditioned on location of the audit opinion and investor sophistication.   
* Correspond to conceptual model paths illustrated in Figure 7. 
  
Taken together, the results of the estimated three-way ANOVA model reported in Table 
3, and the moderated mediation model reported in Table 4 support my predictions in H2. 
Tests of H3  
In H3, I predict that for less sophisticated investors, the indirect effect of headings, 
conditioned on the relative location of the audit opinion, through processing fluency will be 
stronger than the indirect effect through understanding on judgments of financial statement 
reliability.  Results of OLS based path analysis are presented in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 
8.  The path linking understanding scores to financial statement reliability judgments (b2) is 
statistically insignificant (t = 1.39; p = 0.17).  In contrast, the path linking processing fluency to 
financial statement reliability judgments (b1) is significant (t = -1.99; p = 0.03).  Additionally, 
95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects of headings, 
conditioned on the relative location of the audit opinion, as reported in Panel E, show that 
statistically reliable mediation exists only through processing fluency when the audit opinion is 
located at the end of the audit report.  Taken together, this evidence supports H3. 
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Figure 8 
Statistical Diagram of H3 Results 
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Table 5 
Processing Fluency vs. Understanding (H3)
a
 
                        
                        
Panel A: Regression Model of Understanding Scores
b
         
      *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Heading     a2   -0.40   0.37   -1.08     0.14 
Location     a4   -0.91   0.35   -2.59   <0.01 
Heading x Location a5    0.99   0.49   2.01     0.02 
    
 
                    
Panel B:  Regression Model of Processing Fluency
c
         
      *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Heading     a1    2.04   0.67   3.04   <0.01 
Location     a3    0.81   0.64   1.26     0.11 
Heading x Location a6   -1.65   0.89   -1.85     0.03 
  
                       
Panel C:  Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
d
     
      *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Understanding   b2    0.14   0.10   1.39    0.17
h
 
Fluency     b1   -0.11   0.06   -1.99   0.03 
Heading     c1'    0.16   0.42   0.38   0.36 
Location     c2'   -0.50   0.40   -1.24   0.11 
Heading x Location c3'    0.80   0.56   1.44   0.08 
  
         
 
            
Panel D: Conditional Direct Effect(s)
e
             
 
  Location 
 
Effect   SE   t-stat   p-value 
 
  Beginning 
 
0.96   0.36   2.64   0.01 
 
  End 
 
0.16   0.42   0.38   0.36 
           
Panel E: Conditional Indirect Effect(s)
f
             
Mediator   Location 
 
Effect   SE   LLCI   ULCI 
Fluency   Beginning 
 
-0.04   0.08   -0.242    0.042 
Fluency   End   -0.23   0.15   -0.529   -0.039 
Understanding   Beginning    0.08   0.09   -0.004    0.318 
Understanding   End   -0.06   0.07   -0.261    0.008 
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     Table 5 cont.       
            
Panel F: Indirect Effect of Highest Order Product
g
           
 
  Mediator 
 
Effect   SE   LLCI   ULCI 
 
  Understanding 
 
0.14   0.14   -0.006   0.476 
 
  Fluency   0.19   0.15    0.014   0.530 
            NOTES: 
a. Table 5 presents results of analyses of moderated mediation based on OLS regression path analysis for the effects 
of headings on less sophisticated investors' judgments of financial statement reliability through processing fluency 
and understanding scores conditioned on the relative location of the opinion paragraph.  Processing fluency and 
understanding scores are modeled as parallel mediators.  All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
b. Panel A presents the results of the OLS regression model of participants' understanding scores.  Understanding 
scores are calculated based on responses to four questions regarding the content of the audit report's opinion 
paragraph, the paragraph describing the basis of the auditor's opinion, the paragraph describing management's 
responsibility for the financial statements, and the order in which the basic elements of the audit report are 
presented.   
c. Panel B presents the results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  Processing fluency is measured 
by asking participants "How difficult was it to read the audit report" (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult). 
Thus, lower values reflect higher levels of processing fluency. 
d. Panel C presents the results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability judgments.  Financial 
Statement Reliability was measured by asking participants "How much confidence do you have in the reliability and 
accuracy of the values reported in the Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very 
confident).    
e. Panel D reports the effect of including headings in the audit report, conditioned by the relative location of the 
audit opinion, on less sophisticated investors' judgments of financial statement reliability. 
f. Panel E reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples for the 
indirect effect(s) of including headings in the audit report conditioned by the relative location of the audit opinion 
through less sophisticated investors' understanding scores and processing fluency. 
g.  Panel F reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples of 
whether the indirect effect(s) of including headings in the audit report through less sophisticated investors' 
understanding scores and processing fluency, respectively, significantly differs when the audit opinion is presented 
at the beginning of the audit report compared to when it is presented at the report's end. 
h.  Two-tailed p-value 
* Correspond to the paths diagrammed in Figure 8. 
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Tests of H4  
In H4a, I predict that the indirect effect of headings on investment decisions operates 
through a causal sequence between processing fluency and judgments of financial statement 
reliability.  Panel A of Figure 9 presents a statistical diagram of the predicted serial mediation, 
and Panel D of Table 6 presents results of 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals 
based on 10,000 bootstrap samples for the indirect effects of headings on investment decisions.  
Results indicate that when headings are present, the indirect effect through processing fluency to 
reliability judgments on investment decisions (Ind2) is statistically significant (LLCI = -0.129, 
ULCI = -0.013), which supports H1a.   
 H4b predicts that the indirect effect of opinion location on investment decisions operates 
through a causal sequence between processing fluency and judgments of financial statement 
reliability.  However, I do not find sufficient statistical evidence to support H4b (LLCI = -0.039, 
ULCI = 0.044). 
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Figure 9 
Serial Mediation of Investment Decisions (H4) 
 
Panel A: Indirect Effect(s) of Headings on Investment Decisions
a
 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect(s) of Opinion Location on Investment Decisions
b
 
 
Processing 
Fluency
Reliability 
Judgment
Headings
Investment 
Decision
a1H = 0.61 
p = 0.03
a2H = 0.50 
p = 0.01
b1 = 0.12 
p = 0.03
b2 = 0.53 
p < 0.01
cH' = -0.03 
p = 0.47
d21 = -0.15 
p < 0.01
Processing 
Fluency
Reliability 
Judgment
Opinion 
Location
Investment 
Decision
a1L = 0.09 
p = 0.40
a2L = -0.52 
p = 0.06
b1 = 0.12 
p = 0.03
b2 = 0.53 
p < 0.01
cL' = -0.31 
p = 0.17
d21 = -0.13 
p < 0.01
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Table 6 
Serial Mediation of Investment Decisions (H4)
a
 
          
          Panel A: Regression Model of Processing Fluency
b
 
  *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Headings a1H   0.61   0.33   1.83   0.03 
Location a1L   0.09 
 
0.12 
 
-0.27 
 
0.40 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
c
 
  *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Fluency d21   -0.15   0.04   -3.73   <0.01 
Headings a2H   0.50   0.20   2.52      0.01 
Location a2L   -0.31 
 
0.20 
 
-1.57 
 
   0.14 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Investment Decisions
d
 
  *   Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Fluency b1   0.12   0.06   1.91      0.03 
Reliability b2   0.53   0.10   5.07   <0.01 
Headings cH'   -0.03   0.32   -0.08      0.47 
Location cL'   -0.31 
 
0.32 
 
-0.97 
 
   0.17 
          Panel D: Serial Indirect Effect(s) of Headings
e
 
Path     Effect   SE   LLCI   ULCI 
Total       0.29   0.16   0.093    0.622 
Ind1       0.07   0.06   0.002    0.227 
Ind2     -0.05   0.03   -0.129   -0.013 
Ind3      0.26   0.14   0.090    0.589 
 
                  
Panel E: Serial Indirect Effect(s) of Opinion Location
f
 
Path     Effect   SE   LLCI   ULCI 
Total     -0.16   0.14   -0.455   -0.002 
Ind4      0.01   0.05   -0.045     0.118 
Ind5     -0.01   0.03   -0.053     0.029 
Ind6     -0.16   0.13   -0.461   -0.006 
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Table 6 cont. 
NOTES: 
a. Table 6 presents results of tests for serial mediation based on OLS regression path analysis 
for the effects of audit report structure on investment decisions.  All reported p-values are 
one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b. Panel A presents the results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  
Processing fluency is measured by asking participants "How difficult was it to read the audit 
report" (0 = Not at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult). Thus, lower values reflect higher 
levels of processing fluency. 
c. Panel B presents the results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability 
judgments.  Financial statement reliability was measured by asking participants "How much 
confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the 
Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very confident).    
d. Panel C presents results of the OLS regression model of investment decisions.  Investment 
decisions are measured by asking participants to respond to the following:  "Assume that you 
have $50,000 in a checking account to invest in Connected, Inc., or to save.  Having 
reviewed Connected, Inc.'s financial statements, and the audit firm's report on those financial 
statements, indicate how much of the $50,000 will be either invested in Connected, Inc., or 
saved.  The amounts designated for each option must sum to $50,000."  I transform the 
observed values using a logarithmic transformation to stabilize the variance.   
e.  Panel D presents each specific serial indirect effect based on the technique described in 
Hayes (2013).  Total represents the total indirect effect of headings on investment decisions 
through all specific indirect paths.  Ind1 represents the indirect path from headings through 
processing fluency to the investment decision.  Ind2 represents the indirect path from 
headings to processing fluency to judgments of financial statement reliability to the 
investment decision.  Ind3 represents the indirect path from headings to judgments of 
financial statement reliability to the investment. 
f. Panel E presents each specific serial indirect effect based on the technique described in 
Hayes (2013).  Total represents the total indirect effect of opinion location on investment 
decisions through all specific indirect paths.  Ind4 represents the indirect path from opinion 
location through processing fluency to the investment decision.  Ind5 represents the indirect 
path from opinion location to processing fluency to judgments of financial statement 
reliability to the investment decision.  Ind6 represents the indirect path from opinion location 
to judgments of financial statement reliability to the investment. 
* Correspond to the paths diagrammed in Figure 9. 
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Additional Analyses – Experiment One 
In an effort to understand how audit report structure and processing fluency influence 
investors’ decision making, I first examine investors’ affective reactions to the experimental 
materials.  Prior studies demonstrate that the experience of processing fluency induces 
spontaneous positive affective reactions towards the object perceived as fluent and its source 
(e.g., Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001).  The affective response is then interpreted as a cue that 
the information is reliable.  I measure participants’ affective reactions by asking “While reading 
the financial statements, audit report, and making your judgments, what were your feelings 
towards the company, Connected, Inc.?” (0 = Very negative, 10 = Very positive).  I then regress 
processing fluency, headings, and opinion location on my measure of affective response.  Results 
(untabulated) indicate higher levels of processing fluency are associated with stronger positive 
affective feelings (coefficient = -0.09, t = -1.95, p = 0.03), and a significant interaction between 
headings and opinion location (t = 2.09, p = 0.02).   
To test the temporal ordering of the respective effects of processing fluency and positive 
affect, I re-estimate the serial multiple mediator models described in my tests of H4, and include 
my measure of positive affect following processing fluency and preceding judgments of financial 
statement reliability and investment decisions.  Results indicate a statistically significant indirect 
effect of headings on investment decisions that first heightens feelings of processing fluency, 
which then induces positive affect, and, subsequently, increases the amount participants are 
willing to invest (LLCI = -0.129, ULCI = -0.005).  Consistent with H4b, I do not find evidence 
an indirect effect of opinion location on investment decisions. 
Given the consistency of these results with those of H1 and H4, I next examine whether 
participants’ affective reactions differ across levels of investor sophistication.  Consistent with 
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H2, the interactive effect of headings and opinion location in the audit report on positive 
affective feelings towards the company appears to be driven by less sophisticated investors.  
Specifically, when the audit report includes headings, relocating the opinion paragraph to the 
beginning of the report significantly increases positive affect among less sophisticated investors 
(mean = 8.16 vs. 7.25; p = 0.01), but not more sophisticated investors (mean=8.15 vs. 8.59; p = 
0.30).  This provides additional support of the notion that less sophisticated investors avoid 
processing audit report content, and, instead, rely on subjective feelings of processing ease and 
their spontaneous affective states to inform their judgments and decisions. 
Tests of H5  
In H5, I predict that when the audit opinion is adverse, the presence of headings in the 
audit report indirectly and negatively affects investors’ judgments of financial statement 
reliability, and that the indirect effect will operate through feelings of processing fluency.  I also 
predict in H5 that the relative location of the opinion paragraph will moderate the indirect effect 
of headings such that investors will experience higher levels of processing fluency when the 
opinion is presented at the beginning of the report rather than the report’s end.  Thus, investors’ 
judgments of financial statement reliability will be lowest when the audit report includes 
descriptive headings and the opinion is located at the beginning of the report.   
 Table 7 presents results of the OLS path analysis, and Figure 10 illustrates the related 
statistical diagram.  The effect of headings is on processing fluency is significantly moderated by 
the relative location of the audit opinion (path a3, t = -3.14; p < 0.01).  Given that lower values 
reflect higher levels of processing fluency, the negative coefficient (-1.97) indicates that when 
headings are present and the opinion is presented at the beginning of the audit report, higher 
levels of processing fluency are experienced.  The path (b1) between processing fluency and 
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reliability judgments (Panel B of Table 7) is also statistically significant (t = 3.53; p < 0.01).  As 
predicted, the relationship between processing fluency and reliability judgments is negative (b1 = 
0.28), indicating that higher levels of processing fluency lead to lower judgments of financial 
statement reliability when the audit opinion is adverse.  95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect(s) of headings through processing fluency conditioned on the 
relative location of the audit opinion are presented in Panel D.  Confidence interval endpoints 
when the opinion is presented at the beginning of the audit report are entirely below zero (LLCI 
= - 0.757, ULCI = -0.152) indicating statistically significant mediation through processing 
fluency, and the direction of the effect on financial statement reliability judgments is consistent 
with my prediction.   
I also conduct a direct test of whether the indirect effect of headings through processing 
fluency when the opinion is presented at the beginning of the report reliably differs from when 
the opinion is presented at the report’s end.  The resulting confidence intervals estimated in this 
test are reported in Panel E, and confirm that the difference between the respective indirect 
effects are significantly different (LLCI = -1.053, ULCI = -0.215).  Thus, results of these tests 
provide evidence in support of H5. 
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Figure 10 
Statistical Diagram of H5 Results 
 
 
  
Processing 
Fluency
Headings
Reliability 
Judgment
Opinion 
Location
Headings x 
Location
c1' = -0.27 
p = 0.60
c2' = -0.28 
p = 0.60
c3 = 0.60 
p = 0.43
b1 = 0.28 
p < 0.01
a1 = 0.56 
p = 0.19
a2 = -0.03 
p = 0.95
a3 = -1.97 
p < 0.01
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Table 7  
Audit Report Structure, Investor Judgments, and Adverse Opinions (H5) 
        
        Panel A: Regression Model of Processing Fluencyb 
      * Coefficient SE t-stat p-value 
Heading     a1 0.56 0.43 1.31   0.19 
Location     a2 -0.03 0.44 -0.06   0.95 
Heading x Location   a3 -1.97 0.63 -3.14 <0.01 
                
                
Panel B:  Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
c
 
      * Coefficient SE t-stat p-value 
Fluency     b1 0.28 0.08 3.51 <0.01 
Heading     c1' -0.27 0.52 -0.53   0.60 
Location     c2' -0.28 0.53 -0.53   0.60 
Heading x Location   c3' 0.60 0.77 0.79   0.43 
        .       
Panel C: Conditional Direct Effect(s)
d
 
 
  Location Effect SE t-stat p-value 
 
  Beginning -0.33 0.56 0.59 0.56 
 
  End -0.27 0.14 -0.53 0.60 
                
Panel D: Conditional Indirect Effect(s)
e
 
    Location Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
 
  Beginning -0.39 0.18 -0.757 -0.152 
 
  End  0.15 0.14 -0.034  0.424 
 
    
 
        
Panel E: Indirect Effect of Highest Order Product
f
 
 
  Mediator Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
 
  Fluency -0.54 0.25 -1.053 -0.215 
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NOTES: 
a. Table 7 presents results of analyses of moderated mediation based on OLS regression path analysis for 
the effects of headings on less sophisticated investors' judgments of financial statement reliability through 
processing fluency conditioned on the relative location of the opinion paragraph.  All reported p-values are 
one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b. Panel A presents the results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  Processing fluency is 
measured by asking participants "How difficult was it to read the audit report" (0 = Not at all difficult and 
10 = Very difficult). Thus, lower values reflect higher levels of processing fluency. 
c. Panel B presents the results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability judgments.  
Financial statement reliability was measured by asking participants "How much confidence do you have in 
the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the Company's financial statements?" (0=Not at all 
confident, and 10=Very confident).    
d. Panel C presents the direct effect of headings on judgments of financial statement reliability conditioned 
on the relative location of the opinion paragraph. 
e. Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effect(s) of including headings in the audit report through processing fluency on 
judgments of financial statement reliability conditioned on the relative location of the opinion paragraph.   
f. Panel E reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples 
for the indirect effect of the highest order product.  Given that the moderator variable, opinion location, is 
dichotomous, this is a test of equality of the conditional indirect effects of headings across levels of 
opinion location (Hayes 2013). 
* Correspond to the paths diagrammed in Figure 10. 
 
Additional Analyses – Experiment Two 
 In experiment one, I find that when the audit opinion is unqualified, the effect of 
headings on judgments of financial statement reliability interacts with the relative location of the 
opinion paragraph, but only for less sophisticated investors.  In contrast, results of H5 indicate 
that when the audit opinion is adverse, the interactive effect is pervasive across levels of investor 
sophistication.  Results from experiment one also show that the indirect effect of headings 
follows a causal path through processing fluency to judgments of financial statement reliability, 
and finally to investment decisions.  Given the results of H5, I also examine whether the serial 
indirect effect of headings is moderated by opinion location when the audit opinion is adverse. 
 I follow the technique described by Hayes (2015) to test for moderated serial mediation, 
and present results in Table 8.  Panel A presents results of an OLS regression model of 
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processing fluency, and indicates a significant interaction effect (t = -3.14; p < 0.01).  Given that 
lower values indicate higher levels of processing fluency, the coefficient reported in Panel B for 
the impact of processing fluency on judgments of financial statement reliability (0.28) indicate 
that, as predicted, higher levels of processing fluency are associated with lower reliability 
judgments, and this relationship is statistically significant (t = 3.53; p < 0.01).  Also consistent 
with my prediction, lower judgments of financial statement reliability are systematically 
associated with smaller investment decisions (Panel C, coefficient = 0.95; t = 13.29; p < 0.01). 
 Results of my formal test of moderated serial mediation using bias-corrected bootstrap 
samples based on 10,000 bootstrap samples are entirely below zero (LLCI = -0.964, ULCI = -
0.177).  This test provides direct evidence that the relative location of the opinion paragraph 
moderates the serial indirect effect of headings through processing fluency and financial 
statement reliability judgments on participants’ likelihood to invest in the hypothetical company.   
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Table 8 
Moderated Serial Mediation - Adverse Opinions 
a
 
          
          Panel A: Regression Model of Processing Fluency
b
 
      Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Headings      0.56   0.43   1.30     0.19 
Location     -0.03   0.44   -0.06     0.95 
Headings x Location -1.97   0.63   -3.14   <0.01 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Financial Statement Reliability Judgments
c
 
      Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Fluency      0.28   0.08   3.53   <0.01 
Headings     -0.27   0.52   -0.53     0.60 
Location     -0.28   0.53   -0.53     0.60 
Headings x Location  0.60 
 
0.77 
 
0.79 
 
  0.43 
 
 
         Panel C: Regression Model of Investment Decisions
d
 
      Coefficient   SE   t-stat   p-value 
Fluency      0.19   0.09     2.11     0.04 
Reliability      0.95   0.07   13.28   <0.01 
Headings     -0.41   0.57    -0.73     0.46 
Location      0.83   0.59     1.43     0.16 
Headings x Location -0.15 
 
0.84 
 
-0.17 
 
  0.86 
          Panel D: Moderated Serial Indirect Effect(s)
e
 
Mediator             LLCI   ULCI 
Fluency             -0.724   -0.070 
Reliability             -0.676    1.810 
Fluency and Reliability in serial       -0.964   -0.177 
 
                  
 
NOTES 
a. Table 8 presents results of analyses of moderated serial mediation based on OLS regression path 
analysis (Hayes 2015) for the effects of headings on investment decisions through processing 
fluency and judgments of financial statement reliability conditioned on the relative location of the 
opinion paragraph.  All reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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b. Panel A presents the results of the OLS regression model of processing fluency.  Processing 
fluency is measured by asking participants "How difficult was it to read the audit report" (0 = Not 
at all difficult and 10 = Very difficult). Thus, lower values reflect higher levels of processing 
fluency. 
c. Panel B presents the results of the OLS regression model of financial statement reliability 
judgments.  Financial statement reliability was measured by asking participants "How much 
confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the Company's 
financial statements?" (0=Not at all confident, and 10=Very confident).    
d. Panel C presents results of the OLS regression model of investment decisions.  Investment 
decisions are measured by asking participants to respond to the following:  "Assume that you have 
$50,000 in a checking account to invest in Connected, Inc., or to save.  Having reviewed 
Connected, Inc.'s financial statements, and the audit firm's report on those financial statements, 
indicate how much of the $50,000 will be either invested in Connected, Inc., or saved.  The 
amounts designated for each option must sum to $50,000."  I transform the observed values using a 
logarithmic transformation to stabilize the variance.   
e. Panel D reports results a serial multiple mediator model with moderation of one or more indirect 
paths following the technique described by Hayes (2015).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
  In response to calls from audit report stakeholders to improve the report’s utility for 
evaluating financial statements, standard setters have considered a number of changes to the 
report’s content and structure including the use of descriptive paragraph headings and prominent 
placement of the opinion paragraph.  While prior studies have shown that even small changes to 
the presentation format (i.e., structure) of financial statements and disclosures affect investor 
decision-making, little is known about how the audit report’s structure influences investors’ 
evaluations of potential investments.  I conduct two experiments to examine whether proposed 
changes to the audit report’s structure affect nonprofessional investors’ attention to its content.  
Specifically, I examine whether the relative placement of the opinion paragraph and the use of 
descriptive headings affect perceptions of the report’s readability, and, thereby, influence 
judgments of financial statement reliability and investment decisions.  I also examine whether 
the potential effects of these two structural aspects of the audit report differ across levels of 
investor sophistication. 
Results indicate that the audit report’s structure significantly influences nonprofessional 
investors’ judgments and decisions, and that the influence is stronger for less sophisticated 
investors than for those who are more sophisticated.  Specifically, when the opinion is 
unqualified, neither headings nor the location of the audit opinion meaningfully affects how 
more sophisticated investors use the audit report.  In contrast, less sophisticated investors judge 
the financial statements to be more reliable when the audit report includes descriptive paragraph 
71 
 
headings, and this effect is mediated by their perceptions of the report’s readability (processing 
fluency).  The positive impact on judgments of financial statement reliability then flows through 
to positively influence investment decisions.   
The impact of opinion location appears to depend on the type of opinion issued rather 
than the level of investor sophistication.  When the opinion is unqualified, investors exhibit a 
preference, as indicated by their perceptions of the report’s readability, for the traditional 
location of the opinion paragraph at the report’s end.  However, when the opinion is adverse, this 
preference reverses.  Specifically, the influence of audit report structure is strongest when the 
opinion is presented at the report’s beginning and headings are present, and this effect follows a 
causal path through perceptions of the report’s readability to negatively impact judgments of 
financial statement reliability.  The strength of the negative reaction indicates that the heightened 
prominence given to the opinion improves the efficiency with which investors impound the 
negative news.   
However, because of the rarity of departures from the standard unqualified opinion, it is 
unclear whether nonprofessional investors sufficiently understand the implications of an adverse 
opinion.  If this is the case, the negative impact of headings and prominent placement of the audit 
opinion on participants’ evaluations of the financial statements could be driven by the 
metacognitive difficulty associated with interpretation of the opinion (Labroo and Kim 2009).  
Prior studies suggest that it is possible that the increased cognitive ease that participants 
experience (i.e., processing fluency) when they access unexpected negative information, such as 
an adverse audit opinion, is interpreted negatively rather than positively, as would be the case 
when an unqualified opinion is easily accessed (Pochesptsova, Labroo, and Dhar 2010).  The 
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negative reaction to the unexpected cognitive ease then prompts increased effort to understand 
the adverse opinion. 
 A related, but alternative explanation is that the adverse opinion is processed with a 
different cognitive system than the unqualified opinions.  Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre 
(2007) conduct a series of experiments to examine how two separate systems of cognition are 
used to process information, and find that the use of one system rather than the other depends on 
whether the information being processed is consistent with prior expectations.  Dual-processing 
theories of cognition have been extensively studied in cognitive psychology.
22
  In this stream of 
literature, “System 1” is characterized by intuitive and associative reasoning, and, therefore, is 
engaged during heuristically driven decision-making. “System 2” is the more deliberate and 
analytical system of reasoning, and is characterized, among other things, by slower and more 
thorough processing than “system 1” (Alter et al. 2007, 569-570).   
Dual-processing theory implies that heightened processing fluency engages System 1, 
which is consistent with findings that indicate that the mediating effect of processing fluency is 
stronger for less sophisticated investors’ judgments than the mediating effect of their actual 
understanding of the audit report’s content.  Assuming that an adverse opinion is unexpected by 
participants, the unexpected information engages System 2, and, therefore, increases the 
likelihood that readers impound the information communicated by the opinion paragraph into 
their subsequent judgments.   While these potential explanations are consistent with processing 
fluency theories, they are beyond the scope of my study, and should be addressed in future 
research. 
This study makes several important contributions.  First, my results inform auditing 
standard setters as they evaluate recent changes or consider additional changes to the structure of 
                                                          
22
 See Kahneman 2011 for a comprehensive review. 
73 
 
the audit report.  Relative to the proposed or adopted changes to the report’s content, such as 
inclusion of critical audit matter paragraphs, mandating paragraph headings and prominent 
placement of the audit opinion within the audit report would be less likely to affect the risk 
assumed by auditors and issuers.  I provide experimental evidence that two structural aspects of 
the audit report significantly affect the usefulness of the report to nonprofessional investors.  
While nonprofessional investors are an important subset of audit report users, future research 
should examine the implications for other groups of audit report stakeholders.   
My results also contribute to the text signaling literature by answering calls to explore 
how individual signaling devices potentially interact (e.g., Lemarie et al. 2008).  Additionally, I 
extend the text signaling literature by considering how signaling devices trigger subconscious 
reliance on subjective feelings of processing fluency, which contributes to our understanding of 
how text signals affect cognition.  I also make an important contribution to both the processing 
fluency literature in psychology, and studies of the effects of formatting features on investors in 
accounting settings.  Prior studies in both literatures manipulate a number of formatting features 
to elicit feelings of processing fluency.  In my study, I isolate the effects of descriptive headings 
and opinion paragraph location, two individual features of the audit report’s format (i.e., 
structure).  Results suggest that the effects of processing fluency might be more pervasive than 
previously thought, and future research should explore whether other individual aspects of 
readability command similar influence over judgments and decisions.  Finally, the results of this 
study answer calls for research to experimentally examine investor reactions across audit opinion 
types (e.g., Church et al. 2008).  While my study focuses on unqualified and adverse opinions, 
future research should examine investors’ reactions in abstract experimental settings to isolate 
the potential effects of myriad opinion types.
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 Results should be interpreted within the context of my study’s limitations.  For example, 
in my experimental setting, I provide participants with background information, a set of financial 
statements, and the audit report.  Thus, it could be argued that I increase the likelihood that 
participants read the audit report.  This limits my ability to conclude whether the observed results 
would generalize to a setting where investors are less likely to read the report because of the 
presence of more diverse sources of information.  Additionally, I examine how the audit report’s 
structure influences evaluation of a single potential investment.  In the real world, such decisions 
are often based on simultaneous consideration of several potential investments.  Also, my 
experimental setting is constrained to a single reporting period.  Future research should evaluate 
whether the effects of audit report structure persist across multiple reporting periods.  Finally, 
future studies should also consider other potential mediators when evaluating the effects of audit 
report structure on investors’ judgments and decisions.  While I provide evidence that such 
effects operate through processing fluency, it is also possible that other underlying factors that I 
do not observe either enhance or offset the influence of processing fluency on evaluations of 
potential investments. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TASK OVERVIEW 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this task.  I am conducting this research to understand how 
investors view companies. To complete this task, you will read a brief case study about a 
company and answer questions about that case.  Most individuals complete the task in less than 
30 minutes.  
 
Your participation is completely voluntary.  Your responses are anonymous and will be held on a 
password-protected computer. The results of this study may be published or presented at 
professional meetings; however, the findings will be summarized and reported in group form.   
 
Participants will be screened before beginning the task based on responses to three basic 
questions.  If your answers indicate that you do not meet our required characteristics you will be 
redirected to Amazon Mechanical Turk's website and will not be paid.  You must answer all 
questions completely in order to be paid for your participation.  You will be paid $1.50 for 
completing the task. 
 
Thank you again for your participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRB Approval 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s and the University of Virginia’s 
Institutional Review Boards (IRB).  The IRBs determined that this study fulfills the human 
research subject protections obligations required by state and federal law and University 
policies.  If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of 
research, please contact The University of Mississippi’s IRB at (662) 915-7482 or the University 
of Virginia’s IRB at (434) 924-5999. 
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How many accounting courses have you completed? 
___ 0 
___ 1 
___ 2 
___ 3 
___ 4-10 
___ 10+ 
 
How many finance courses have you completed? 
___ 0 
___ 1 
___ 2 
___ 3 
___ 4-10 
___ 10+ 
 
Have you ever read a company’s financial statements? 
___ Yes 
___ No 
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Overview 
 
In the following screens you will be presented with background information for a company in 
which you are evaluating as a potential investment.  In addition to background information, you 
will be provided with the company's financial statements, and the independent auditor's report on 
those financial statements.  Please pay close attention to the information you are provided. After 
reviewing the information, you will be asked to evaluate the company on a number of 
dimensions.   
 
Please note that you will not be able to return to previously viewed screens, so it is important to 
read all information carefully. 
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Background Information 
 
Connected Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells a variety of internet modems and wifi 
hardware. The company operates in a very competitive industry, and markets its product to 
consumer retailers in a variety of segments including online, big box, and computer specialty 
hardware stores. Connected Inc. is very committed to meeting analysts' earnings targets and has 
not missed a target in the past four years.  Connected Inc.'s upper management, including the 
CEO and CFO, are paid bonuses in cash and stock options for meeting accounting based 
performance goals, including net income targets, which is consistent with the practices of other 
companies operating within the industry.   
 
Connected Inc. has engaged Smith & Co., CPA, a large audit firm, to perform the annual 
financial statement audit. Smith and Co., CPA summarize and describe the results of their audit 
in a signed audit report, which will be presented along with Connected, Inc.'s financial 
statements in subsequent screens. You will then be asked a number of questions about the 
financial statements and audit report, and your feelings about Connected, Inc. as a potential 
investment.   
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Connected, Inc. 
Comparative Balance Sheet 
December 31, 2014 
 
Balance Sheet Items 2014 
   
2013 
Assets 
     
Cash and Cash Equivalents 6,197,884 
   
6,160,850 
Marketable Securities 1,668,494 
   
1,533,839 
Net Accounts Receivable 17,509,257 
   
17,475,039 
Inventory (FIFO) 15,488,632 
   
15,440,548 
Prepaid Expenses 1,652,155 
   
1,632,845 
Total Current Assets 42,516,422 
   
42,243,121 
Property, Plant and Equipment 22,895,866 
   
22,856,884 
Less: Accumulated Depreciation (3,858,901) 
   
(3,698,995) 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment 19,036,965 
   
19,166,889 
Intangibles - Net 1,153,798 
   
1,244,336 
All other Non-Current Assets 3,518,708 
   
3,497,648 
Total Assets 66,225,893 
   
66,151,994 
Liabilities and Owners' Equity 
     
Accounts Payable 10,009,308 
   
9,953,419 
Accrued Tax Liability 560,526 
   
580,458 
Notes Payable - Short-Term 6,176,412 
   
6,239,994 
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt 2,187,716 
   
2,241,432 
Other Current Liabilities 5,961,973 
   
5,928,350 
Total Current Liabilities 24,895,935 
   
24,943,653 
Long-Term Debt 8,242,398 
   
8,197,201 
Other Non-Current Liabilities 3,217,171 
   
3,185,046 
Common Stock 3,514,500 
   
3,514,500 
Retained Earnings 26,355,889 
   
26,311,594 
Total Shareholders' Equity 29,870,389 
   
29,826,094 
Total Liabilities and Owners' Equity 66,225,893 
   
66,151,994 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 55% 
   
55% 
Current Ratio 1.7 
   
1.7 
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Connected, Inc. 
Income Statement 
For the Year Ended December 31, 2014 
 
 
2014 
   
2013 
   
2012 
Sales 126,945,800 
   
126,978,621 
   
126,792,870 
(Sales Returns & Allowances) (2,553,770) 
   
(2,580,000) 
   
(2,501,965) 
Net Sales 124,392,030 
   
124,398,621 
   
124,290,905 
(Cost of Goods Sold)  (89,021,248) 
   
(89,001,234)  
   
(88,934,776)  
Gross Profit 35,370,782 
   
35,397,387 
   
35,356,129 
(Selling & Administrative Expenses) (25,796,549) 
   
(25,829,169) 
   
(25,813,577) 
Operating Income 9,574,233 
   
9,568,218 
   
9,542,552 
All Other Revenue (Expenses) - Net (433,252) 
   
(433,530) 
   
(447,008) 
Earnings Before Interest & Taxes 9,130,981 
   
9,134,688 
   
9,095,544 
Interest Expense (676,680) 
   
(693,274) 
   
(676,180) 
Earnings Before Taxes 8,454,301 
   
8,441,414 
   
8,419,364 
Income Taxes (2,587,015) 
   
(2,586,373) 
   
(2,583,310) 
Net Income 5,867,286 
   
5,855,041 
   
5,836,054 
EPS $1.67 
   
$1.67 
   
$1.66 
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Connected, Inc. 
Statement of Cash Flows 
For the Year Ended December 31, 2014 
 
 
2014 
   
2013 
   
2012 
Operating Activities 
         
Net Income 5,867,286 
   
5,855,041 
   
5,836,054 
Adjustment for Depreciation 1,553,851 
   
1,525,792 
   
1,502,107 
Adjustment for Amortization 90,538 
   
90,537 
   
90,537 
Changes in Receivables (34,218) 
   
(40,803) 
   
98,560 
Changes in Inventories (48,084) 
   
(3,951) 
   
5,228 
Changes in Prepaid Expenses (19,310) 
   
(47,297) 
   
30,080 
Changes in Other Non-Current Assets (21,060) 
   
(59,079) 
   
(22,917) 
Changes in Accounts Payable 55,889 
   
(13,849) 
   
21,656 
Changes in Taxes & Other Current Liabilities 13,691 
   
37,678 
   
(7,579) 
Changes in Other Non-Current Liabilities 32,125 
   
(31,564) 
   
59,674 
Cash Flow from Operating Activities 7,490,708 
   
7,312,505 
   
7,613,400 
Investing Activities 
         
Changes in Marketable Securities (134,655) 
   
2,717 
   
(36,464) 
Net Purchases (Disposals) of Property, Plant, 
and Equipment 
(1,423,927) 
   
(1,451,970) 
   
(1,432,698) 
Cash Flow from Investing Activities (1,588,582) 
   
(1,449,253) 
   
(1,469,162) 
Financing Activities 
         
Net Increase (Decrease) in Long-Term Notes 
Payable 
(8,519) 
   
(13,202) 
   
(5,919) 
Net Increase (Decrease) in Short-Term Notes 
Payable 
(63,582) 
   
26,715 
   
(32,467) 
Cash Dividends Paid (5,822,991) 
   
(5,842,807) 
   
(5,772,420) 
Cash Flow from Financing Activities (5,895,092) 
   
(5,829,294) 
   
(5,810,806) 
Net Cash Flows 37,034 
   
33,958 
   
333,432 
Beginning Cash Balance 6,160,850 
   
6,126,895 
   
5,793,463 
Ending Cash Balance 6,197,884 
   
6,160,853 
   
6,126,895 
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Experimental Audit Report Manipulations 
[Unqualified (Adverse) x Headings x OpinionEnd condition] 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Connected, Inc.: 
 
 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of Connected, Inc. (the "Company") as of December 31, 2014 
and 2013, and the related statements of income and cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended 
December 31, 2014. 
Responsibilities of Management for the Financial Statements 
Management is solely responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial statements in 
accordance with US GAAP, and for such internal control as management determines is necessary to enable the 
preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. 
Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements 
Our responsibility is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from 
material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and to issue an auditor's report that includes our opinion. 
Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can 
arise from error or fraud and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be 
expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of these consolidated financial statements. 
 
Basis for Opinion 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
("PCAOB") (United States). Our responsibilities under those standards are further described in a previous section of 
our report. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether 
the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. 
Our audit included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, 
whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks.  Such procedures include 
examining, on a test basis, appropriate evidence regarding the amounts and disclosures in the financial 
statements.  Our audit also included evaluating the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by 
management, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements. We believe that our audit 
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
(Adverse)Opinion 
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements (do not) present fairly, in all material respects, the financial 
position of Connected, Inc.. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the results of operations and its cash flows for 
each of the three years then ended December 31, 2014, in conformity with United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles ("US GAAP"). 
 
/s/ Smith and Co., CPA 
New York, New York 
February 21, 2015 
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[Unqualified (Adverse) x Headings x OpinionBeginning condition] 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Connected, Inc.: 
(Adverse) Opinion 
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements (do not) present fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of Connected, Inc.. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the results of operations and 
its cash flows for each of the three years then ended December 31, 2014, in conformity with U. S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of Connected, Inc. (the "Company") as of December 
31, 2014 and 2013, and the related statements of income and cash flows for each of the three years in the 
period ended December 31, 2014. 
 
Responsibilities of Management for the Financial Statements 
Management is solely responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial statements in 
accordance with US GAAP, and for such internal control as management determines is necessary to 
enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
error or fraud. 
 
Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements 
Our responsibility is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are 
free from material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and to issue an auditor's report that 
includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an 
audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards will always detect a material 
misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from error or fraud and are considered material if, 
individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of 
users taken on the basis of these consolidated financial statements. 
 
Basis for Opinion 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board ("PCAOB") (United States). Our responsibilities under those standards are further described in a 
previous section of our report. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether 
due to error or fraud. 
Our audit included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks.  Such 
procedures include examining, on a test basis, appropriate evidence regarding the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements.  Our audit also included evaluating the accounting principles used 
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
/s/ Smith and Co., CPA 
New York, New York 
February 21, 2015 
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[Unqualified (Adverse) x No Headings x OpinionEnd condition] 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Connected, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of Connected, Inc. (the "Company") as of December 
31, 2014 and 2013, and the related statements of income and cash flows for each of the three years in the 
period ended December 31, 2014. 
 
Management is solely responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial statements in 
accordance with US GAAP, and for such internal control as management determines is necessary to 
enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
error or fraud. 
Our responsibility is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are 
free from material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and to issue an auditor's report that 
includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an 
audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards will always detect a material 
misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from error or fraud and are considered material if, 
individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of 
users taken on the basis of these consolidated financial statements. 
 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board ("PCAOB") (United States). Our responsibilities under those standards are further described in a 
previous section of our report. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether 
due to error or fraud. 
 
Our audit included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks.  Such 
procedures include examining, on a test basis, appropriate evidence regarding the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements.  Our audit also included evaluating the accounting principles used 
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements (do not) present fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of Connected, Inc.. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the results of operations and 
its cash flows for each of the three years then ended December 31, 2014, in conformity with United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("US GAAP"). 
 
/s/ Smith and Co., CPA 
New York, New York 
February 21, 2015 
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[Unqualified (Adverse) x No Headings x OpinionBeginning condition] 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Connected, Inc.: 
 
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements (do not) present fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of Connected, Inc.. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the results of operations and 
its cash flows for each of the three years then ended December 31, 2014, in conformity with United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("US GAAP"). 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of Connected, Inc. (the "Company") as of December 
31, 2014 and 2013, and the related statements of income and cash flows for each of the three years in the 
period ended December 31, 2014. 
 
Management is solely responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial statements in 
accordance with US GAAP, and for such internal control as management determines is necessary to 
enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
error or fraud. 
Our responsibility is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are 
free from material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and to issue an auditor's report that 
includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an 
audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards will always detect a material 
misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from error or fraud and are considered material if, 
individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of 
users taken on the basis of these consolidated financial statements. 
  
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board ("PCAOB") (United States). Our responsibilities under those standards are further described in a 
previous section of our report. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether 
due to error or fraud. 
Our audit included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks.  Such 
procedures include examining, on a test basis, appropriate evidence regarding the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements.  Our audit also included evaluating the accounting principles used 
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
/s/ Smith and Co., CPA 
New York, New York 
February 21, 2015 
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How much confidence do you have in the reliability and accuracy of the values reported in the 
Company’s financial statements in general? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Confident 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Assume that you have $50,000 in a checking account to invest in Connected, Inc., or to save.  
Having reviewed Connected, Inc.’s financial statements, and the audit firm’s report on those 
statements, indicate below how much of the $50,000 will be either invested in Connected, Inc. or 
saved. The amounts designated for each option must sum to $50,000. 
 
Amount invested in Connected, Inc. 
 
$0  
 
    
 
Amount saved       $0  
 
    
 
Total 
    
$0  
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
How useful was the audit report in deciding whether or not to invest in this company? 
 
0 = Not at 
all Useful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Useful 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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How difficult was it to read the auditor’s report? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Difficult 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
While reading the financial statements, audit report, and making your judgments, what were your 
feelings towards the company, Connected, Inc.? 
 
0 = Very 
Negative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Positive 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
While reading the financial statements, audit report, and making your judgments, what were your 
feelings towards the audit firm, Smith & Co., CPA? 
 
0 = Very 
Negative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Positive 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Which of the following best describes Connected, Inc.’s financial statements? 
___ The financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial 
position of the Company, the results of operations and its cash flows. 
 
___ The financial statements do not present fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of the Company, the results of operations and its cash flows. 
 
___ Neither 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Which of the following best describes management’s responsibility for the preparation and fair 
presentation of the financial statements? 
___ Management is solely responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the 
financial statements. 
 
___ Management shares responsibility with the auditors for the preparation and fair 
presentation of the financial statements. 
 
 ___ Neither 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Which of the following best describes the basis of the auditor’s opinion? 
___ The audit standards require that the auditors plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. 
___ The audit standards require that the auditors plan and perform the audit to obtain 
absolute assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. 
 ___ Neither  
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Which of the following choices best describes the presentation order of the information in the 
audit report? 
 ___ Opinion, Management’s Responsibility, Auditor’s Responsibility,  
  Basis of Opinion 
 
 ___ Management’s Responsibility, Auditor’s Responsibility,  
  Basis of Opinion, Opinion 
 
 ___ Opinion, Auditor’s Responsibility, Management’s Responsibility,  
  Basis of Opinion 
 
 ___ Auditor’s Responsibility, Management’s Responsibility,  
  Basis of Opinion, Opinion 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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The audit report used descriptive headings to identify separate topics throughout the report. 
 ___ True 
 
 ___ False 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
How difficult was it for you to determine who was responsible for the financial statements? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Difficult 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
To what degree is the company’s management responsible for the information presented in the 
financial statements? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Completely 
Responsible 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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To what degree is the audit firm responsible for the information presented in the financial 
statements? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Completely 
Responsible 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
How much assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement is the audit 
firm responsible for providing? 
 
0 = No 
Assurance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Absolute 
Assurance 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
How important was the audit firm’s opinion in making your judgments about the company’s 
financial statements? 
 
0 = Not at all 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very 
Important 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Below are four basic elements of the auditor’s report. Please rank them in order of their 
respective importance (1 = Most important, 2 = Second-most important, 3 = Third-most 
important, 4 = Least important) to you as you formed your judgments about the company and 
made your investment decision. 
 ___ Auditor’s Opinion 
 
 ___ Basis of Auditor’s Opinion 
 
 ___ Management’s Responsibility for the Financial Statements 
 
 ___ Auditor’s Responsibility 
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(DEMOGRAPHICS) 
 
What is your gender? 
 
 ___ Male 
 
 ___ Female 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
How old are you? 
 
 ___ Under 18 
 
 ___ 18-25 
 
 ___ 26-34 
 
 ___ 35-54 
 
 ___ 55-64 
 
 ___ 65 or older 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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How old were you when you first learned to speak English? 
 
 ___ Less than 5 years old 
 
 ___ 5 – 10 years old 
 
 ___ 11 – 15 years 
 
 ___ 16-20 years old 
 
 ___ 21 years old or older 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
What were you doing last week? 
 
 ___ Working a full-time job for pay or profit, that is, 35 hours or more 
 
 ___ Working for pay or profit part-time, that is, 1 – 34 hours 
 
 ___ Working two or more part-time jobs for pay, totaling 35 or more hours 
 
 ___ Unemployed, laid off, or looking for work 
 
___ With a job but not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or work 
stoppage 
 
 ___ With a job but on family leave (maternity or paternity leave) 
 
 ___ In school 
 
 ___ Keeping house 
 
 ___ Doing volunteer work 
 
 ___ Other 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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For what kind of business or industry do you or did you work?  Choose one from the list below 
that best matches the job you consider to be your primary employment. 
 
 ___ Construction and Extraction 
 
 ___ Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
 
 ___ Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
 
 ___ Office and Administrative Support 
 
 ___ Management, Business, and Financial 
 
 ___ Production 
 
 ___ Professional and related 
 
 ___ Sales and related 
 
 ___ Service 
 
 ___ Transportation and Material Moving 
 
 ___ Other 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
How many total years of work experience do you have? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
 ___ Less than High School (0 – 8 years) 
 
 ___ Some High School (9 – 12 years, but did not graduate) 
 
 ___ GED or High School Equivalency 
 
 ___ High School Graduate 
 
 ___ Attended a Vocational or Trade School after High School 
 
 ___ Some College (no degree) 
 
 ___ 2-year College Degree (Associate’s degree) 
 
 ___ 4-year College Degree (BS, BA, or similar) 
 
 ___ Some postgraduate (no degree) 
 
 ___ Postgraduate (MS, MA, PhD, MD, etc.) 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
What was your major in college? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
What was your undergraduate major? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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What is or was your graduate major? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
Approximately how many auditing courses have you completed? 
 
 ___ None 
 
 ___ 1 
 
 ___ 2 
 
 ___ 3 
 
 ___ 4 – 10 
 
 ___ 10+ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Approximately how many statistics courses have you completed? 
 
 ___ None 
 
 ___ 1 
 
 ___ 2 
 
 ___ 3 
 
 ___ 4 – 10 
 
 ___ 10+ 
 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
Approximately how many specialized mathematics courses have you completed? 
 
 ___ None 
 
 ___ 1 
 
 ___ 2 
 
 ___ 3 
 
 ___ 4 – 10 
 
 ___ 10+ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Have you ever invested in an individual company’s stock? 
 
 ___ Yes, directly 
 
 ___ Yes, through a pension or formal retirement account 
 
 ___ No 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
Have you ever invested in a mutual fund? 
  
 ___ Yes, directly 
 
 ___ Yes, through a pension or formal retirement account 
 
 ___ No 
 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
Approximately what is the current value of your investment portfolio in individual company 
stocks? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
Approximately what is the current value of your investment portfolio in mutual funds in which 
you invested directly? 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Approximately what is the current value of your investment portfolio in mutual funds held 
through retirement accounts? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
When evaluating a company’s stock as a potential investment, how often do you examine a 
company’s financial statements (for example, through its annual report or SEC filings) as part of 
your evaluation? 
 
 ___ Never 
 
 ___ Rarely 
 
 ___ Sometimes 
 
 ___ Most of the time 
 
 ___ Always 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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When evaluating a company’s stock as a potential investment, how often do you examine the 
audit report on the company’s financial statements as part of your evaluation? 
 
 ___ Never 
 
 ___ Rarely 
 
 ___ Sometimes 
 
 ___ Most of the time 
 
 ___ Always 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Do you rent or own your home? 
 
 ___ Rent 
 
 ___ Own 
 
 ___ Neither – I am staying with family or friends without either renting or owning 
 
 ___ Neither – I do not currently have a home 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Have you ever tried to figure out how much you or your household would need to save for 
retirement? 
 
 ___ Yes 
 
 ___ No 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Have you developed a plan for retirement saving? 
 
 ___ Yes 
 
 ___ No 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
How often have you been able to stick to this plan? 
 
 ___ Never 
 
 ___ Rarely 
 
 ___ Mostly 
 
 ___ Always 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
How do you see yourself:  Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks? 
 
 
0 = Not at all  willing 
to take risks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 = Very willing 
to take risks 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Which of the following statements below comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you 
are willing to take when making investments or saving? 
 
 ___ Take substantial financial risk expecting to earn substantial returns 
 
 ___ Take above-average financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns 
 
 ___ Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
 
 ___ Not willing to take any financial risk 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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(INSTRUCTIONAL CHECK) 
 
What do you think this study was about?  Research in decision making shows that people, when 
making decisions and answering questions, prefer not to pay attention and minimize their effort 
as much as possible.  Some studies show that over 50% of people don’t carefully read questions.  
If you are reading this question and have read all the other questions, please select the box 
labeled ‘other’.  Thank you for participating and taking the time to read through the questions 
carefully! 
 
 ___ Good decision making 
 
 ___ Financial decision making 
 
 ___ Understanding financial statements 
 
 ___ Understanding audit reports 
 
 ___ Other 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  Page Break on Qualtrics Screen  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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